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Abstract
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issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
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Policy Research Working Paper 5913
This paper analyzes the role of labor market institutions 
in explaining the development of shadow economies in 
European countries. The analysis uses several alternative 
measures of the shadow sector, and examines the effects 
of labor institutions on the shadow sector in two 
specific regions: new and old European Union member 
countries, as their respective shadow sectors exhibited a 
different development in the past decade. Although the 
share of the shadow economy in gross domestic product 
averaged 27.5 percent in the new member countries 
in 1999–2007, the respective share in the old member 
states stood at 17.9 percent. The paper estimates the 
effects of labor market institutions on two sets of shadow 
economy indicators—shadow production and shadow 
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effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at kfialova@email.cz. 
employment. Comparing alternative measures of the 
shadow sector allows a more granulated analysis of labor 
market institution effects. The results indicate that the 
one institution that unambiguously increases shadow 
economy production and employment is the strictness of 
employment protection legislation. Other labor market 
institutions—active and passive labor market policies, 
labor taxation, trade union density, and the minimum 
wage setting—have less straightforward and statistically 
robust effects and their impacts often diverge in new and 
old European Union member countries. The differences 
are not robust enough, however, to allow for rejecting the 
hypothesis of similar effects of labor market institutions 
in new and old European Union member states.  
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Introduction 
The shadow economy covers a wide range of activities that are, by  definition, difficult  to 
observe and measure.
2 Consequently, there are  also as many ways  to define  the shadow 
economy.
3 In our paper, the following definition is used in correspondence with the European 
Commission (EC, 2004), OECD (OECD, 2004) or related research (for instance Schneider et 
al., 2010): the shadow economy covers production of goods and services that is lawful by its 
nature, but is intentionally not declared to the public authorit ies. That means, this definition 
excludes any illegal activities and also household production. 
Shadow economy and informal labor markets are closely connected: by its very definition, 
any activity taking place in shadow economy involves informal labor market to some degree.
4 
Economic  subjects  may  be  either  excluded  from  the  formal  labor  market  by  lack  of 
opportunities  or  exit  the  formal  sector  voluntarily  because  of  both  monetary  and  non -
monetary benefits of informality. These two motives may be considered  as complementary 
with different accent on each of them in different social and economic environments. Perry et 
al. (2007) link the voluntary exit motive mainly with independent workers acting as self -
employers, while majority of salaried employees is cons idered to be involuntarily excluded 
from formal labor market in Latin America and the Caribbean. Usually, the exclusion motive 
is perceived far less important in developed countries (see Oviedo et al., 2009).  Turning into 
shadow economy might pursue severa l goals, from avoiding payment of taxes and  social 
security contributions to avoiding complying labor market, environmental or other standards 
and administrative procedures. Furthermore, the phenomenon has many dimensions, from full 
non-compliance and non-reporting of employment or business activities to under-reporting of 
employment, wages etc. 
Despite  being  usually  referred  to  in  a  negative  perspective,  shadow economy  can  also 
comprise some positive aspects (e.g. opportunity to escape dysfunctional and in efficient 
government regulations). These are, however, generally limited to less developed countries 
and in European context, the inefficient regulation might be addressed together with efforts to 
fight shadow economy (OECD, 2004).
5 Consequently, shadow economies in Europe represent 
rather  an  obstacle  to  economic  development,  bringing  substantial  costs.  These  can  be 
identified in several areas on both micro and aggregate level, ranging from direct impact on 
public finance, performance of firms and situation of individuals.  
Among the most important negative consequences and costs of shadow economies are usually 
cited: revenue losses in form of taxes and social security contributions which necessitate 
larger burden put on formal workers; deficient protection  of informal workers by labor 
standards and social protection system; lower productivity of informal firms given by small 
size, restricted access to capital, technologies and markets, no legal enforcement of contracts 
                                                 
2 A variety of names has been used in the literature to describe this highly complex phenomenon. For instance: 
hidden, informal, undeclared, clandestine, moonlight, parallel, underground, second, irregular, illicit, unofficial 
economy. 
3 For a broader discussion of the definition of the shadow economy, see e.g. Thomas (1992), Pedersen (2003), 
Enste (2003) or OECD (2004).  
4 Informal work can take many forms, from a second job together with a regular employment to non-
participation in formal labor market at all. For a discussion on this topic see Schneider (2003). 
5 On the other hand, Enste (2003) cites a research done by Friedrich Schneider, showing also the positive aspect 
of the issue, given by the fact that about two-thirds of the income earned in the informal economy is spent in the 
formal sector, having a stimulating effect there. Furthermore, the author claim that about two-thirds of the value 
added produced by the informal sector would not be produced in the formal sector if the informal did not exist. 3 
 
and property rights etc.;
6 unfair competition; overutilization of public goods and services by 
informal sector that does not contribute to public budgets. In a broad perspective, shadow 
economy  might  be  a  source  of  distortion  to efficient  allocation  of  resources,  constrain 
economic growth and u ndermine social cohesion and legitimacy of state.
7  For a detailed 
overview of shadow economy consequences see for instance Schneider and Enste (2000) or 
Oviedo et al. (2009). 
Besides these direct consequences, existence of informal economy might alter the  effect of 
economic policy which might become less efficient, the magnitude of this effect depending on 
the size of shadow economy. Informal economy may intensify unfair competition between the 
states and social dumping. On the European level, for example,  different size of shadow 
economies distorts the contributions to the EU budget that are based on the officially declared 
GDP. Some studies also point to link between illegal immigration and undeclared work (see 
for instance EC, 2007).  
The European Union has been addressing the shadow economy phenomena with emphasis 
since late 1990s, developing a strategy to combat undeclared work (this even became one of 
the goals listed in the Lisbon agenda). In its study, European Commission (EC, 2004) puts a 
special  attention  to  the  group  of  new  member  states  (hereafter  ―NMS‖)  and  candidate 
countries,  where  informality  has  a  slightly  different  character  given  the  previous  era  of 
centralized  economies  and  consequent  transformation  period  connected  with  large 
institutional, economic and societal changes. Indeed, there exist marked differences between 
the size of shadow economies in old and new European Union member countries.
8 While the 
share of the shadow economy in GDP averaged 27.5% in new member states over the period 
1999-2007, the respective share in the old member states stood at only 17.9%.  
Shadow  economy  is  a  complex  phenomenon,  determined  by  numerous  economic, 
institutional, regulatory, social and cultural factors. Generally, these are the factors affecting 
decision-making of individuals and firms whether to stay formal or turn informal, based on 
financial  motives  with  potentially  different  moral  evaluation  of  both  situations.  In  our 
research, we focus on labor market institutions as these have been considered one of the main 
forces  driving  economic  agents  to  informality  in  existing  economic  research  (see  e.g.. 
Schneider and Enste, 2000, OECD, 2004, Oviedo et al., 2009). Substantial differences in 
institutional frameworks exist across the European countries, althou gh some convergence 
could be observed recently (see Fialová and Schneider, 2009). 
In this  paper,  we present  a multiple country, aggregate level  econometric analysis of the 
impact of labor market institutions and institutional reforms on the size of shadow economies 
in  European  countries  and  various  trends  in  their  development  in  period  2000-2007.  We 
analyze changes in labor market institutions and their impact on the share of the labor force in 
shadow employment and on the shadow economy production. Furthermore, we address the 
                                                 
6 In contrast, Schneider (2003) argues that informal sector exhibits higher level of productivity compared to the 
official economy. One of the reasons he mentions is stronger work effort of informal workers, whose pay is not 
burdened by huge taxes, social contributions and other regulations. 
7 For a detailed survey of costs and benefits considered by individuals and firms in decision-making about 
turning informal, see Djankov et al. (2003). 
8 For the purpose of this paper, we consider old EU countries group as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United 
Kingdom and non-EU Norway (sixteen countries). New member states group (―NMS‖) consists of countries 
acceding to the EU in 2004 and 2007: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania (twelve countries) unless indicated otherwise. 4 
 
differences between the old EU members and new member states that joined the EU in 2004 
and 2007.  
We use panel data estimation techniques and two stage least squares estimation procedure 
with  instrumental variables on country level  data and aggregated variables constructed to 
capture changes in key labor and social protection institutions over time. Our estimations 
exploit  cross-country  and  time  series  variability  in  key  variables,  covering  employment 
protection legislation, taxes on labor including social insurance, labor market policy spending, 
minimum wage setting, and the effect of collective bargaining over wages. Furthermore, we 
control for other factors such as economic environment, business regulation, overall fiscal 
regulation and regulatory quality and control of corruption. We use two separate concepts of 
the  informal  sector,  or  shadow  economy:  (i)  shadow  production  (measured  as  percentage 
share on official GDP); and (ii) shadow employment (measured as share of people earning 
money from unregulated employment and self-employment). Using two different alternative 
measures  of  the  informal  sector  and  running  regressions  on  the  same  set  of  explanatory 
variables gives revealing results and it is one of the key contributions of our paper to recent 
economic  research.  Our  results  indicate  that  the  strictness  of  employment  protection 
legislation  unambiguously  increases  shadow  economy  production  and  employment.  Other 
labor market institutions examined in our paper―active and passive labor market policies, 
labor  taxation,  trade  union  density  and  the  minimum  wage  setting―tend  to  have  less 
straightforward and statistically robust effects and their impact sometimes diverge in new and 
old EU member countries, as is the case of trade unions membership that tends to increase the 
shadow economy in old EU member states, but it works in the opposite direction in the new 
member  states.  These  differences  are  not  robust  enough,  however,  for  us  to  reject  the 
hypothesis of similar effect of labor market institutions in new and old EU member states.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we briefly sketch the development of 
shadow economy in European countries and compare old and new EU members. The next 
section describes the main factors driving economic subjects to informality and offers a short 
literature overview. In the following section, we discuss major institutional indicators and 
their  developments  and  we  also  overview  main  theoretical  arguments  about  their  role  in 
development  of  shadow  economy.  The  fourth  section  offers  data  and  methodology 
description. The fifth section then summarizes key findings and results of our analysis of the 
labor market institutions’ effects. The final part discusses conclusions from our research and 
their limits. 
 
1.  Shadow economy in Europe  
Given the substantial heterogeneity of motives for being informal and the difficulty to even 
define the large number of phenomena that shadow economy might cover, it is also very hard 
to  measure  its  scope  in  different  countries.  Generally,  three  approaches  to  measuring  the 
shadow  economy  can  be  distinguished:  direct  methods,  indirect  methods  and  model 
approaches.  For  detailed  discussion  of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  different 
estimation  methods  see Schneider  and  Enste  (2000),  Oviedo  et  al.  (2009)  or  Perry  et  al. 
(2007). While direct methods based on micro evidence enable uncovering individual motives 
and characteristics of informal workers and firms, indirect methods and model approaches 
lend an aggregate perspective. In our approach, we follow two sets of indicators of shadow 
economies in European countries based on different sources and approaches. The statistics are 
given in Annex 1. 5 
 
Firstly, we use the estimation of shadow production as percentage share on official GDP of 
countries. The source of the data is research of Schneider et al. (2010), who provide a unique 
database of the size and trends in the shadow economies of 162 countries between 1999 and 
2006/2007. The estimations are based on a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) 
model approach.
9 The clear advantage of this dataset is the unified methodology and a broad 
sample. Many other studies also use this data (see e.g. Loayza et al., 2005, Perry et al., 2007). 
Besides  stating  the  share  of  shad ow  economy  output  on  overall  official  output  of  the 
economy, this indicator estimates the share of employment in the informal sector as well 
under the assumption that the trends in productivity of informal labor track the similar 
development as the productivity of formal labor force. Still, this model approach also has 
considerable shortcomings and the data should be considered with caution. The main concern 
about this approach is the theoretical background of relation between the shadow economy 
and its indicators and question of causality that might be subject to discussion. Nevertheless, 
although some other approaches may give a different picture about the situation in shadow 
economy, we believe that the unified methodology offers an opportunity to consistently study 
the differences among countries and development in time. For comparison of estimation by 
different methods see Schneider and Enste (2000). 
As the second set of indicators we utilize  shadow employment as the share of labor force in 
unregulated self- and wage-employment. To estimate this variable we have four proxies with 
different  data  sources  coming  from  the  Eurostat.  Firstly,  we  use  one  indicator  from  the 
household survey European Union-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), 
stating the share of labor force not contributing to pension system (both private and public) 
adjusted for the unemployment rate.
10 Yet, this variable is available for 2007 only and offers a 
very  rough  picture  of  shadow  employment.  Also  the  reliability  of  the  i nformation  is 
questionable.
11 Moreover, comparison of this variable with previously mentioned indicator of 
shadow production uncovers substantial differences between these two data sets. As described 
in Annex 1, ranking of countries changes substantially wh en ordered according to values of 
these variables.
12 Secondly, based on the Labor Force Survey (LFS) we use three proxies of 
shadow employment. Two of them indicate the share of labor force working in small firms 
with less than ten employees and the share of self-employed. Both these groups are supposed 
to be more exposed to shadow employment (Perry et al., 2007); however, the link need not be 
as straightforward and need not be of the same intensity in all the countries. Again, these 
variables are available for 2006-2007 only. The last proxy from the Eurostat consolidated LFS 
we use states "workers without a contract" as the share of labor force. For our country sample, 
the variable is available in longer time series since 2001. The shortcoming of this proxy is that 
Eurostat adds up all workers who are on temporary legal contracts and workers with no 
written contract, all together.
  13  That means, this group covers both those who are indeed 
employed in the shadow economy, and those who are employed legally, but on a temporary 
                                                 
9 For details on the methodology used, see Schneider et al. (2010). 
10 The adjustment for the unemployment rate makes this variable methodologically comparable to the other 
indicators on shadow employment that we use in our analysis. Furthermore, this approach of course represents 
an implicit assumption that the unemployed are not primarily considered to be engaged in the informal sector. 
11 Some cases needed to be deleted due to evident inconsistencies regarding development in time or comparison 
with similar countries. 
12 Comparison of values of these two indicators per se is not possible given the different nature of data and 
different methodology. 
13 OECD (2002) shows that temporary employment is concentrated in groups of younger and less educated 
workers, workers employed in low-skill occupations, agriculture and small firms. These are also categories more 
prone to informal behavior. 6 
 
basis.
14 This variable is clearly also not ideal for the purposes of our analysis, nor are the other 
shadow employment proxies and we are thus dealing with second- and third-best variables to 
identify  informal  workers.  Yet,  no  other  official   data  on  shadow  employment  with  a 
comparable methodology are available. Given the above-mentioned deficiencies of the whole 
second set of indicators on shadow employment, we will mostly use the first dataset on 
shadow production estimated by Schneider et al. (2010) further in this section.  
Generally, Europe ranks rather low on the informality scale. According to Schneider et al. 
(2010), the average size of the shadow economy was 34.0% of GDP in eighty-four developing 
countries in 2007, 32.6% in twenty Eastern European and Central Asian transition countries 
and 16.6% in twenty-five OECD countries. The respective average for twenty-eight selected 
European countries examined in this paper was 21.1% in 2007: 25.9% in the NMS group and 
17.4% in old European countries. Yet, there still persist large differences among the particular 
countries.  
The heterogeneity in the old European countries group is stable: in period 1999 -2007, the 
variation coefficient  hovered around 30% without any clear trend in the old Europe.  The 
heterogeneity of shadow economies in the NMS group was substantially lower throughout the 
whole examined period with a moderate decreasing trend between 1999 and 2004―variation 
coefficient fell from 20.4% down to 18.8% and subsequently hovered around 19%. Alongside 
mild reduction of the heterogeneity within its own respective group, differences between new 
and old member states have been diminishing only moderately as Table 1 and Figure 1 show: 
the gap between the average values of these two groups shrank from 9.9 to 8.4 percentage 
points between 1999 and 2007 with a local peak in 2000 (10.3 percentage points). The share 
of shadow economy seems to be decreasing in recent years in the entire sample with slightly 
stronger dynamics registered in the NMS group. Moreover, while the major cuts in shadow 
production took place at the beginning of the examined period in old European countries, 
NMS  group  recorded  the  largest  reductions  rather  by  the  end  of  the  period.  Overall,  the 
differences between these two groups of countries generally tend to diminish. 
Informality was least prevalent in Austria and Luxembourg, where its share on GDP did not 
exceed 10% in 2005-2007, followed by the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom (less 
than 15%) and Ireland and Germany.
15 On the contrary, the highest ratios of shadow economy 
to official GDP, exceeding 30%, were registered in the NMS group: in Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
and Romania;
16 Estonia and Latvia managed to cut their shadow production just below this 
threshold in the examined period. Poland, Malta and Cyprus follow very closely with 26-28%. 
Yet, issue of large informal sector is not limited to post-transition countries only. Several old 
member  states  (southern  European  countries–Greece  and  Italy  in  particular)  also 
exhibit a large degree of informality. Within the NMS group, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia found themselves close to the average of old EU members. 
                                                 
14 The rationale is that "contract" is only for formally contracted employees with an open ended position. This, of 
course, disregards those who are contracted legally on a temporary or term appointment basis. This limitation 
might have been overcome with a sort of dummy variable that would control for whether countries allow 
temporary contracts or not.  However, as indicated by OECD (2002), temporary work is an important feature of 
the employment legislation in most OECD European countries and, hence, there is no sufficient variation across 
countries’ labor regulation on this matter for further investigation of this issue. 
15 In case of Germany, smaller shadow economy was, perhaps surprisingly, documented in the eastern part 
(Schneider, 2003). 
16 This situation is confirmed by the European Commission report (EC, 2007), according to which the share of 
informal economy on the GDP in Bulgaria and Romania was the highest in the group of countries acceding to 
the EU between 2004 and 2007. 7 
 
 
Table 1: Shadow economy in Europe: % of GDP, 1999-2007 
   1999-2001  2002-2004  2005-2007 
Austria  9.8  9.8  9.6 
Belgium  22.3  21.9  21.5 
Bulgaria  36.9  35.5  33.4 
Cyprus  28.7  28.0  27.2 
Czech Republic  19.1  18.6  17.4 
Denmark  18.1  17.9  17.2 
Estonia  32.6  31.5  29.9 
Finland  18.1  17.7  17.2 
France  15.3  15.0  14.8 
Germany  16.1  16.2  15.6 
Greece  28.5  27.5  26.6 
Hungary  25.1  24.3  23.8 
Ireland  16.0  15.9  15.5 
Italy  27.2  26.9  26.9 
Latvia  30.5  29.4  27.8 
Lithuania  33.6  32.2  30.4 
Luxembourg  9.9  9.8  9.6 
Malta  27.3  27.5  26.9 
Netherlands  13.2  13.2  13.1 
Norway  19.1  18.8  18.2 
Poland  27.7  27.5  26.4 
Portugal  22.8  22.9  23.2 
Romania  34.1  32.8  30.9 
Slovak Republic  18.9  18.3  17.2 
Slovenia  27.0  26.4  25.3 
Spain  22.7  22.4  22.3 
Sweden  19.3  18.7  18.2 
United Kingdom  12.7  12.5  12.3 
NMS average  28.3  27.7  26.4 
Old Europe average  18.2  18.0  17.6 
Source: Schneider et al. (2010), own calculations 
 
Figure 1: Shadow economy in Europe: % of GDP, comparison of old EU members and 
NMS averages, 1999-2007 
 
Source: Schneider et al. (2010), own calculations 
 
Figure  2  sheds  some  light  on  development  of  informal  economic  sectors  in  particular 
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and average of 2005-2007. The only country where shadow production share increased (by 
negligible 0.4 percentage points) was Portugal. In contrast, extensive shadow economies (the 
Baltics, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece etc.) shrank the most, weakening their leading positions in 
the countries’ ranking. Faster reduction of shadow economy was generally recorded in all the 
new member states; Finland and Sweden also decreased the share of their respective shadow 
economies considerably. 
Figure 2: Increase/decrease (+/-) of the shadow economy in Europe, average 1999-2001 
compared to average 2005-2007, difference in percentage points  
 
Source: Schneider et al. (2010), own calculations 
 
2.  Factors influencing the shadow economy 
Previous part showed that the overall trend in size of shadow economy in Europe has been 
towards further growth in recent years. That means that the relevance of this issue increases in 
time. What are the main factors driving economic subjects to informality? This and the next 
sections  offer  a  short  literature  overview.  Generally,  there  exist  no  general  and  universal 
factors determining the existence, size and development of a shadow economy. Instead, it is a 
result  of  a  complex  interplay  of  various  factors  varying  between  countries.  Moreover, 
economic  factors  can  only  partly  explain  the  development  of  shadow  economies; 
interdisciplinary approach to this issue is necessary (see Enste, 2003).  
Level  of  economic  development  is  often  considered  one  of  the  most  important  factors 
determining  the  size  of  shadow  economy:  less  developed  countries  tend  to  have  larger 
informal  sectors  (see  Perry  et  al.,  2007).  In  contrast,  no  consensus  exists  as  regards  the 
development of informality over the business cycle. Countercyclical development would be 
expected based on the view that informal sector mainly consists of employment excluded 
from formal sector as a result of labor market rigidities. This traditional view was supported 
by research of Loayza and Rigolini (2006). However, in a broader perspective taking into 
account  also  the  voluntarily  opt-out  of  formal  sector,  pro-cyclical  development  might  be 
advocated.  This  is  supported  by  the  view  that  informal  workers  are  not  covered  by 
employment protection and firms are free to dismiss them during downturns, enabling also 






































































































































































































































informal  self-employment  connected  with  higher  riskiness  in  case  there  are  plenty  of 
opportunities in the formal sector during an economic boom, enabling an easy potential return 
to the formal sector (Taylor, 1996). Moreover, as Perry et al. (2007) show, informality is 
mainly connected with smaller firms and limited access to capital, both meaning a greater 
vulnerability during recessions. This perspective was confirmed for instance by research of 
Fiess et al. (2008) or Maloney (1998). The distinction between the particular sub-segments of 
shadow employment (employees vs. self-employed) is of crucial importance in this respect. 
Regulatory distortions and corruption represent another highly important factor influencing 
the size of shadow economies (the effect was described in detail e.g. in Djankov et al., 2002, 
Johnson et al., 2000, or Friedman et al., 2000). Regulation tends to bring about to economic 
subjects both direct costs (fees, bribes etc.) and indirect costs (time, forgone profits etc.); 
moreover,  both  quantity  and  quality  of  regulation  is  of  importance.  Loayza  et  al.  (2005) 
classify overall regulation from the shadow economy viewpoint into three categories, judging 
that regulation policy comes in ―packages‖. The authors distinguish fiscal, labor and product-
market regulations, where the latter consists of the entry, trade, financial markets, bankruptcy, 
and contract enforcement indices. These all are rather quantitative measures. Consequently, 
the authors assess the quality of regulatory framework by a governance index, composed of 
indicators of corruption, prevalence of law and order and level of democratic accountability. 
They  conclude  that  heavier  regulatory  burden,  especially  in  product  and  labor  markets, 
depresses  economic  growth  and  has  a  positive  effect  on  informality.  The  adverse  effects 
might be, however, mitigated by improved governance. Apparently, labor market regulations 
might have a considerable impact on inducing informality.  Perry et al. (2007) show that part 
of growth in shadow employment in Latin America and Caribbean was due to the increased 
burden of labor costs and other legal restrictions in several countries. Similar result showing 
the adverse effect of labor regulations in Latin America environment presents Loayza (1994). 
Labor regulations are separately dealt with in detail in the next section. 
The above mentioned research of Loayza et al. (2005) represents one of the studies stressing 
the  importance  of  general  legitimacy  of  the  state,  trust  in  government  and  quality  of 
governance and public services provided by the state as another crucial factor determining 
size  of  shadow  economies.  Enste  (2003,  p.  98)  considers  shadow  economy  itself  “…an 
indicator of a serious deficit of legitimacy of the present social order and the existing rules of 
official economic activities”. In turn, quality of governance and public services might enhance 
the incentives of operating formally by increasing the benefits of contributing to the system 
and  maintain  individuals  and  firms  in  the  formal  sector  in  spite  of  large  taxation  and 
regulation,  outweighing  its  negative  effect  (as  was  showed e.g. on  case of Belgium―see 
Djankov et al., 2003). 
Besides these general drivers of shadow economy, specific factors may be important as well. 
Among  these  might  be  counted  effects  of  macroeconomic  policies  (macroeconomic 
stabilization,  liberalization  of  capital  account,  trade  reforms),  demographic  and  structural 
factors etc. We will not consider these in case of our European sample, given the level of 
development of old member states and the fact that main transformation changes in the new 
members economies took place already during the 1990s.  
Development and determinants of shadow economy in the post-transition countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe have recently begun to draw increasing attention in economic research. 
The main findings were summarized by Belev (2003) for the entire group of EU new member 
states  and  other  South  European  countries  and  OECD  (2008)  for  the  Czech  Republic, 
Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. According to OECD (2008), early 1990s witnessed a rapid 10 
 
growth of informality in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary due to sudden 
lack of formal job opportunities. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, complete informality is 
not  considered  a  major  problem.  One  of  the  main  issues  is  under-declaration  of  income, 
similarly to Hungary and Poland. That potentially means that the main reason for opting-out 
for  informality  is  not  pure  survival  but  rather  tax  and  regulation  evasion.  Enste  (2003) 
mentions other specific factors effective in Eastern Europe: lack of competence and trust in 
state,  corruption,  weakly  guaranteed  property  rights,  insufficient  enforcement  of  law  and 
regulations, high taxes, large regulation, general acceptance of illicit work. Furthermore, he 
considers  lack  of  clear  and  stable  institutional  framework  as  the  major  driver  of  shadow 
economy in transition countries. 
 
3.  Labor market institutional indicators, their effects and developments  
This section discusses in detail the effect of particular components of labor market regulation 
on informality and sketches the situation in European countries with an accent on difference 
between the NMS and old European countries. According to Perry et al. (2007), labor market 
institutions affect shadow economy through three different channels: 
  excessive labor costs (resulting from taxes and social contributions, minimum wages, 
trade unions’ claims, employment protection legislation rigidity etc.) tend to reduce 
number of jobs in formal sector; 
  inappropriate legislation creates incentives for voluntary opt for informal sector―both 
for employees, self-employers and small firms; 
  labor market rigidity impacts productivity growth.  
The perspective of our research mainly focuses on the first and partly also the second channel. 
However, also the third channel might be highly important in European context.
17 In our 
approach we follow five main aspects of labor market institutional framework:
18 taxation of 
labor, employment protection legislation, minimum wage setting, the effect of collective 
bargaining over wages, and labor market policy spending.  
Labor taxation 
Taxes distort basic decision-making of individuals between work and leisure and affect the 
official labor supply and consequently also the shadow employment. The larger the tax wedge 
on labor and difference between labor costs and take-home wage, the greater the incentive to 
avoid paying taxes and other contributions.
19 Schneider and Enste (2000) consider the raise of 
taxes  and  social  contributions  one  of  the  main  factors  contributing  to  growth  of  shadow 
economy.
20 The overall complexity of the tax system might play a role as well, as higher 
                                                 
17 See for instance the debate on diverging economic performance of the United States and Europe in Nickell 
(1997). 
18 Similarly to other studies on effects of labor market institutions (e.g. Nickell, 1997, Riboud et al., 2001, Cazes 
and Nesporova, 2003). 
19 In this respect, it is irrelevant whether we analyze income taxes or social security contributions, as highly 
redistributive nature of most social security programs separates their contributions from entitlements. 
20 The adverse effect on increasing motives to turn informal might stem not only from taxation of labor (payroll 
taxes and social contributions), but also from indirect taxes (Spiro, 1993) and corporate tax burden (Johnson et 
al., 1998b). The influence of taxation may also be asymmetrical, i.e. raising taxes may drive employment into the 
shadow at the margin, by a greater extent, than lowering taxes brings employees back into the formal economy. 
Moreover, there exists substantial inertia in reaction of shadow employment to hikes in taxes. Spiro (1993) 
describes a growth in informal economy connected with hikes in indirect taxes in Canada during recession in 11 
 
intricacy brings about both direct costs and opportunity costs to evade and encourages hiding 
in the system (Schneider and Enste, 2000). Johnson et al. (1998a, 1998b) mention that the 
extent  of  regulatory  and  administrative  discretion  is  the  main  factor  driving  people  to 
informality,  not  higher  taxes  per  se.  The  authors  demonstrate  that  higher  income  and 
corporate  tax  rates  reduce  the  size  of  the  shadow  economy.  Friedman  et  al.  (2000)  also 
identified a negative relationship between tax rates and shadow economy and claimed that 
economic subjects turn into informality not to avoid taxes, but rather to reduce bureaucratic 
burden and corruption. Taxes, in their view, have two potentially offsetting effects: the direct 
effect represents incentive to evade taxes, while indirect effect encourages official economic 
activity through provision of a better legal environment. 
The issue of labor taxation and shadow economy is closely connected with public goods 
provision―Johnson  et  al.  (1997,  1998b)  present  a  model  of  relationship  between  these 
variables. High taxes increase motivation for tax evasion, reducing the tax revenues, which 
ultimately  leads  to  further  erosion  of  state  legitimacy  and  resources  for  public  goods 
provision. This development results in a vicious circle, driving countries to bad equilibrium 
defined by high taxes, low tax collections and poor quality of public goods. The authors show 
that  smaller  shadow  economies  are  connected  with  lower  taxes  resulting  in  higher  tax 
revenues, lower regulation and less corruption and bribery and better rule of law―i.e. good 
equilibrium (characteristic for both some high-income OECD countries and also some Eastern 
European  countries).  In  contrast,  several  transition  countries  have  higher  regulation, 
corruption and weaker rule of law and higher tax rates resulting in lower tax collections and 
greater  shadow  economy―i.e.  bad  equilibrium  (Latin  America,  former  Soviet  Union 
countries).  
Labor taxes in the European Union are very high, the highest in the world. Measured by 
implicit tax rate on labor incomes, average tax on labor in 2000-2007 period exceeded 40% in 
Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Italy  and  Sweden  (see  Annex  2).  On  the  other  hand, 
Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and United Kingdom emerged as the low-tax 
countries with the implicit tax rates on labor under 30%. In period 2000-2007, average tax 
rate stood at 35.1% in all the examined countries and the respective averages for new member 
states and old European countries reached 33.5% and 36.2%, indicating lower tax burden on 
labor in the NMS group. Generally, European countries exhibited an average trend towards 
reduction  of  the  tax  burden  on  labor  in  given  period,  NMS  group  recording  a  more 
pronounced decline compared to the old member states. In particular, large cuts in implicit tax 
rates on labor took place in Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Denmark 
and Finland. In contrast, Cyprus, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg and the Netherlands increased 
their labor taxation somewhat. 
Employment protection legislation 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is a part of overall regulations referring to legal 
framework  governing  conditions  of  hiring  and  firing.  It  mainly  restricts  freedom  of 
individuals in the formal sector by restricting the employers’ freedom to dismiss workers and 
thus reduces the flows into, but also out of, unemployment. Restrictions on hiring and firing 
increase  adjustment  costs  of  firms  and  might  result  in  preferred  use  of  fixed-term  and 
temporary contracts.  Ultimately, strict employment  protection might  reduce incentives  for 
formal employment by firms. Moreover, the increased costs can be shifted to employees and 
                                                                                                                                                         
1991 and hypothesizes that going informal might turn into a habit and decline in respect for legal modes of 
behavior might not be abandoned with revival of economic growth.  12 
 
provide them an incentive to turn informal as well. Generally, enforcement of the regulation is 
the crucial factor, not the extent of regulation itself.  
The adverse  effect  of  rigid  regulation  on incentive for operating formal has  been largely 
documented in  empirical  literature, as  has  been summarized above. Johnson  et  al.  (1997, 
1998a,  1998b)  present  an  empirical  evidence  of  significant  positive  effect  of  overall 
regulation on shadow economy. Loayza et al. (2005) reach a similar conclusion as regards the 
effect of regulation on shadow economy. The study utilizes several measures of regulation 
and shows a positive effect of each of them including labor regulations.  
We  follow  the  OECD  methodology  (2004)  for  measuring  the  strictness  of  employment 
protection.
21 Data for old European countries and NMS-4 (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia 
and Hungary) are available from OECD in longer time series. Data for the rest of NMS group 
except Malta and Cyprus come from IZA database and were available for years 1999, 2003 
and 2007 only. Therefore, NMS average in the following paragraph and Annex 2 refers to 
above  mentioned  four  countries  only  for  sake  of  comparability  of  development  in  time. 
Overall situation in European countries is shown in Annex 2.  
The most liberal hiring and firing conditions were recorded in Denmark, Hungary, Ireland and 
Slovak Republic in period 2000-2007. France, Greece, Portugal and Spain found themselves 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  spectrum.  Southern  European  countries  have  the  toughest 
regulation while the rules are more relaxed as one moves north. The most substantial changes 
leading to relaxation of employment protection in this period took place in Slovak Republic, 
Greece, Italy, Austria, and Portugal. On the contrary, Poland, Hungary and Ireland tightened 
their  legislation  moderately.  Generally,  EPL  in  NMS-4  is  not  as  strict  as  in  the  other 
group―the  average  EPL  index  was  significantly  lower  (1.9  in  period  2000-2007).  Old 
European  countries  recorded  average  EPL  index  at  2.4  with  a  decreasing  trend  in  given 
period. However, if we extend our comparison to other NMS countries not covered in OECD 
data as well, the situation looks much different. The rest of the NMS group has generally 
much tougher legislation compared to NMS being OECD members. Taken altogether, NMS-
10 group has in average comparably rigid employment protection legislation as old European 
countries (reaching 2.3 for all three years with data available). The toughest legislation was 
recorded in Lithuania and Slovenia, but the latter mentioned country relaxed its hiring and 
firing conditions in given period substantially (similarly to Bulgaria). In contrast, Romania 
exhibited certain tightening of its employment protection during the examined period. 
Minimum wages 
Economic  theorists  have  not  reached  a broad  consensus  regarding  the consequences  of 
the minimum wage so far. Nevertheless, on the microeconomic level it is usually generally 
accepted  that  although  it  might  have  some  positive  impact  on  the motivation  to  increase 
productivity among low-paid workers (Stigler, 1946; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Cahuc 
and  Michell,  1996),  on  shifting  the employment  composition  toward  high-wage  jobs 
(Acemoglu, 2001), as a motivational device in the efficient wages framework (Rebitzer and 
Taylor, 1995; Manning, 1995), or in the case of a monopsony (Card and Krueger, 1995), there 
                                                 
21 The OECD developed a system of indicators, including a single overall composite indicator. As many as 
twenty two measures describing various aspects of EPL, covering regular and temporary contracts and collective 
dismissals, were aggregated into a summary indicator using a set of weights. The resulting EPL index 2 covers 
conditions of regular and temporary contracts, and terms of collective dismissals. Indices reach the values from 1 
to 6, low index indicates flexible legislation and liberal hiring and firing environment, while stricter protection is 
reflected in a higher value of the index. 13 
 
exists a threshold over which the negative effects of the minimum wage tend to prevail. Here, 
effective minimum wage increases labor costs of firms and prevents them from employing 
workers whose productivity does not exceed the minimum wage tariff (Deere, Murphy, and 
Welch, 1995; Neumark and Wascher, 2003; Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999; Bazen and 
Martin,  1991).  The  higher  its  level  is  set,  the  larger  negative  consequences  do  occur. 
The effect  is  considered  stronger  for  particular  groups  of  workers  with  the lowest 
productivity, especially the youngest and the least experienced. These low-productive workers 
excluded from the official labor market than either enter the pool of unemployment, find a job 
in informal sector, or become officially unemployed while working in the shadow economy.
22 
In all these cases, minimum wage causes economic losses in terms of efficiency. The situation 
is  confirmed  to  some  extent  by  the  existing  empirical  research.  For  a  summary  of 
the empirical research results on this issue, see for example Brown et al. (1982) or OECD 
(1998).  
Apart from influencing labor market performance directly, the  minimum wage might have 
additional indirect effects due to its interaction with other  institutions and policies. OECD 
(2004) mentions the minimum wage’s potential to mitigate tax evasion by under-reporting of 
earnings of employees (together with measures to restrict part-time and temporary work).
23 
These  fiscal  effects  in  terms  of  reducing  t ax  evasion  in  a  competitive  environment 
characterized by underreporting of earnings by employed labor were confirmed by research of 
Tonin (2007). Different conclusion can be made based on the results of Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) who report that a binding  minimum wage might amplify the adverse unemployment 
effects of labor taxation by preventing tax shifting to workers.  
All the NMS but Cyprus have introduced legally binding minimum wage. Furthermore, many 
old European countries don’t have legally binding minimum wage, but usually there exist an 
effective minimum wage determined by collective bargaining (Austria, Germany, Denmark, 
Italy, France, Norway, and Sweden). Real  economic burden represented by the minimum 
wage is usually measured by a relative share of minimum wage on average/median wage in 
the economy. However, this indicator is not available for some countries or periods. Situation 
in  the  NMS  and  other  European  countries  with  data  available  is  reported  in  Annex  2. 
Belgium,  France,  Greece,  Luxembourg  and  Malta  had  the  highest  real  minimum  wage 
exceeding 45% of average wage in industry and service sector in 2007. On the contrary, the 
lowest minimum wages relative to average wage were recorded in Estonia, Latvia, Poland, 
Romania  and  Slovakia.  Generally,  NMS  exhibited  considerably  lower  minimum  wages 
compared to old Europe, but there was a clear trend in increasing the minimum wage tariffs in 
period 2000-2007. By raising its level, the differences between the NMS and the other group 
narrowed in the examined period. 
Trade unions 
The role of trade unions in collective bargaining process is also a factor influencing wage 
formation and determining labor costs and flexibility of firms. Theory suggests that the trade 
unions  generally  tend  to  raise  wages,  cause  labor  market  rigidities  and  thus  influence 
unemployment and formal employment. The more workers they cover, the higher this impact. 
Moreover, trade unions might push toward higher regulation of the official labor markets, 
                                                 
22 For details on higher prevalence of low-qualification and low-productivity labor in the informal sector se for 
instance Perry et al. (2007) for Latin America or Grabowski (2003) for Poland. 
23 Besides the potential positive effect on tax collection, all these measures ultimately reduce the labor market 
flexibility―see for instance Fialová and Schneider (2009). 14 
 
which  might  be  consequently  reflected  in  higher  informality.  For  summary  of  empirical 
findings see for instance OECD (1997, 2004). In reality, the negative effect might be offset by 
the extent to which unions and/or firms coordinate their wage determination (Nickell and 
Layard, 1999; OECD, 1997). Presence of trade unions in a firm might also lead to a more 
intense oversight of potentially informal activities of the firm. As showed in Zahariev (2003) 
using Bulgarian data, weak trade unions give more powers to management of companies in 
raising tax evasion and informal activities without employees’ agreement. As a result, the 
overall effect of trade unions on informality might be ambiguous. 
In most of the European countries, trade unions play an important role in wage determination 
process. Their power is traditionally measured by the share of workers who are trade unions’ 
members―trade union density.
24 Overall situation in European countries is depicted in Annex 
2. The source of our data is the OECD database mainly, that covers old European countries 
and NMS-4 (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) in longer time series. Data for 
the rest of NMS group except Malta and Cyprus again come from IZA database and were 
available for  years 1999, 2003 and 2007 only.  Therefore, NMS average in  the following 
paragraph  and  Annex  2  refers  to  above  mentioned  four  countries  only  for  sake  of 
comparability of development in time.  
The data show higher trade union influence in old member countries, which might be on the 
other hand offset by higher degree of centralization and coordination (see for instance Fialová 
and  Schneider,  2009).  Trade  union  density  is  in  average  much  lower  in  the  NMS  group 
compared  to  old  European  average.  Moreover,  while  the  indicator  has  had  an  increasing 
tendency  in  old  Europe,  NMS  group  clearly  exhibited  an  opposite  trend.  The  highest 
unionization exceeding 50% of wage earners among the examined countries has traditionally 
been characteristic for northern Europe―Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Belgium. 
In  contrast,  relatively  modest  levels  of  trade  unionization  (under  20%)  were  recorded  in 
France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and several NMS―Hungary, Poland, Estonia and 
Lithuania. Most countries exhibited a decline in trade union density in period 2000-2007 
(with exception of Belgium, Norway and Slovenia); the largest reductions were registered in 
Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania. 
Labor market policies 
Labor  market  policies  (LMP)  may  also  have  ambiguous  impact  on  unemployment,  labor 
market  performance  and  incentives  for  informal  behavior.  Empirical  literature  on 
determinants of informality does not provide any clear evidence on effects of this factor as far 
as the authors know. Nevertheless, we assume that potential consequences of this factor are 
implied by its influence on labor market flexibility and motivation of individuals to seek 
employment and adjust their wage claims.   
                                                 
24 However, even if the density might be rather low in some countries, it is a common practice to extend the 
agreements also to non-unionized workers, thus covering a large share of employees in the whole economy (e.g. 
France, Spain). Thus, the degree of collective bargaining coverage (share of all salary earners whose wage is 
actually determined by a collective agreement―legal extension of bargained wage rates to non-unionized 
workers) might be a more reliable indicator in terms of real economic consequences. The level of union 
coordination and centralization is also an important aspect. Coordination refers to ability to coordinate 
bargaining among various unions and employers’ organizations. Centralization refers rather to the level of 
bargaining (firm, industry, country) and the role of the government; high degree of centralization does not 
necessarily have to mean close coordination. Yet, data on these aspects of trade union functioning are rather 
limited. 15 
 
Active  LMP  aim  at  enhancing  human  capital  and  sustaining  employability  of  their 
participants; the provisions may improve the efficiency of job-matching process. Although 
negative  effects  do  occur  (substitution  effects  and  deadweight  losses―see  for  instance 
Martin, 2000), empirical studies  often find overall positive effects  of these provisions  on 
employability of workers (OECD, 1993). Consequently, involuntary shift to informality might 
be limited; the effect on voluntary opting for informality is not clear.  
On the other hand, passive LMP may decrease the job-search intensity and motivation of 
unemployed to accept a job offer and lower the economic costs of unemployment, raise the 
employees’ wage claims and thus might push up the overall unemployment. Furthermore, it 
might  strengthen  the  incentive  for  operating  informally  while  receiving  unemployment 
benefits at the same time. At the same time, passive LMP might have a negative effect on 
informality―securing  income  during  unemployment  might  increase  ―informal  reservation 
wage‖  of  the  unemployed  and  thus  reduce  shadow  economy.  The  generosity  of 
unemployment insurance system is of particular importance (Layard et al., 1991). The overall 
effect is therefore again rather ambiguous. 
Main characteristics  of  European countries’  LMP systems  are presented in  Annex 2. We 
measure the relative generosity of the system by its expenditure as a share of official GDP per 
percentage point of unemployment in the country in given year. Generally, countries spend 
relatively more resources on passive LMP. There exist very significant differences between 
the two groups of countries. NMS in average spend relatively small amount of resources on 
LMP. The difference is especially remarkable in case of active LMP, where the old European 
average exceeds the NMS average nearly seven-times. The similar comparison for passive 
LMP expenditure gives a five-fold difference. While old European countries in general tended 
to  cut  their  LMP  expenditure  in  given  period,  the  trend  in  the  NMS  group  was  slightly 
opposite, although any more precise comparison is impossible due to data limitation. The 
most generous LMP systems as regards both active and passive measures are observed in 
Denmark and the Netherlands. On the contrary, the smallest amount of resources directed to 
active LMP measures  was recorded in Greece, Malta, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and the 
United Kingdom.  The smallest expenditure on passive LMP was recorded in Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia. 
 
4.  Data and methodology  
This  section  describes  the  methodology  and  data  used  in  our  analysis  of  labor  market 
institutions’ effects on various shadow economy’s indicators. To this end, we use econometric 
models inspired by recent empirical research and by economic theory set out in previous parts 
of this paper.
25 To estimate the effect of labor institutions on shadow economy, we use panel 
data estimation techniques and two stage least squares estimation procedure with instrumental 
variables. As there is scarce data available, we utilize three data samples covering different 
countries and time periods. Definition and data sources for all the variables used in  our 
analysis are given in Annex 3.
26 
                                                 
25 Similar methodology was applied for instance in Loayza et al. (2005) or Friedman et al. (2000).  
26 Descriptive statistics are available from the authors upon request. 16 
 
First, we constructed a panel of nineteen European countries and used data for period 2000-
2007 (basic data sample――S1‖).
27 Out of all the countries  in  the panel,  fourteen are old 
member countries, one is Norway, which we classify as an old member country for purposes 
of this paper, and remaining four countries are the NMS. The source of the data is mainly the 
OECD  and  partly  also  Eurostat,  World  Bank  and  Heritage  Foundation.  However,  as  this 
sample  covers  only  four  NMS  (the  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,  Hungary  and  Poland)  we 
expanded our analysis to other NMS as well in the second, extended data sample (―S2‖). The 
panel consists of twenty-eight countries, twelve of which are the NMS.
28 Yet, the availability 
of relevant data is a serious obstacle. Several OECD variables had to be replaced by less 
accurate indicators provided by the Eurostat. Moreover, the necessary set of indicators  is 
available for a shorter time period of 2006-2007 only. The third sample we use in our analysis 
(―S3‖)  consists  of  twenty-six  countries,  ten  of  which  are  the  NMS.
29  The  time period 
concerned is years 2003 and 2007. The source of the data is mainly the OECD and partly also 
Eurostat, World Bank and Heritage Foundation, similarly to the first sample. Furthermore, we 
extended OECD data for information from IZA database, which includes all the OECD 
measures of labor market institutions for the non -member countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe.
30 Given the limited amount of data available, the second and the third samples are 
used for robustness checks mainly.  
We examine the impact of institutional factors on five indicators of shadow production and 
employment: shadow economy as percentage share on overall official GDP (SHEC), share of 
labor force in unregulated self- and wage-employment measured by share of labor force not 
contributing to the pension system adjusted for the unemployment rate (CONTRIB), share of 
labor force employed in small firms with less than ten employees (LESS10) or being self-
employers (SELFEMPL) and share of labor force employed without a legal written contract 
(CONTRACT).
  31 The shortcomings of the four latter indicators were already described in 
previous part of our paper. Moreover, utilization of the first mentioned dependent variable is 
also  partially  problematic  because  some  of  the  independent  variables  we  use  (or  similar 
measures to those we use) were also utilized as elements in the MIMIC estimation of the 
shadow economy.
32 As a result, estimation based on this dependent variable might bias the 
results to certain extent. Still, as shown in Friedman et al. (2000), utilizing these data does not 
change the nature of general findings when compared to results obtained for data estimated by 
other methods. But once again, no better indicators of shadow economy in comparable 
methodology are available. Still, one has to bear these limitations in mind when viewing our 
results.  
                                                 
27 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 
28 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Romania, and United Kingdom. 
29 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Romania, and United Kingdom. 
30 For details on methodology see Lehmann and Muravyev (2009). 
31 For description of data sources and discussion of information relevancy of these indicators see Section 1 and 
Annex 3. 
32 This method estimates the size of the shadow economy from both likely causes and effects of the informal 
activity. The underlying variables comprise the size of the government, the unemployment rate, government 
effectiveness, the GDP per capita, currency (M0 over M1), the growth rate of GDP per capita, the labor force 
participation rate, the fiscal freedom index, the share of direct taxation, the business freedom index, the growth 
rate of total labor force (Schneider et al., 2010). 17 
 
The  regression  coefficients  are  estimated  using  the  generalized  two  stage  least  squares 
random-effects instrumental variables regression estimation procedure (models 1.1,  3.1-5.1), 
two stage least squares estimation procedure with instrumental variables on cross-sectional 
samples  (models  2.2  and  2.3)  and  two  stage  least  squares  estimation  with  instrumental 
variables on pooled panel data (for models 1.2, 3.2-5.2 and 1.3, 3.3-5.3). The feasibility of 
utilization of these approaches was tested by Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests (which were replaced 
by xtoverid test procedure in Stata application, introduced by Schaffer and Stillman, 2006, for 
testing  coefficients  estimated  in  the  RE  and  FE  panel  estimation  procedure  in  case  that 
covariance matrix in Hausman test was not positive definite) and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier test for presence of random effects.   
The regression equation has following form for all samples: 
X ti = α + β1 EPLti + β2 MWti + β3 TUt + β4 TAXti + β5 LMPAti + β6 LMPPti + 
+ β7 ln GDPPCti + β8 FISFti + β9 BUSFti + β10 CORRti + β11 REGQUALti +  εti   (1),  
where  X  takes  the  form  of  SHEC,  CONTRIB,  SELFEMPL,  LESS10,  and  CONTRACT  in 
consequent regressions (Model 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively). The detailed description of all 
the models applied in our analyses is given in Annex 4.  
The independent variables and their expected effects were described in the previous section. 
In our samples S1 and S3, we used the OECD’s employment protection legislation index, 
version 2 (EPL). In the sample S2, this variable was replaced by inverse value of indicator of 
labor freedom as the employment protection index is not available for non-OECD countries 
over a longer time period. Minimum wage (MW) is a cluster variable constructed according to 
minimum wage level as a share of median wage in the economy in the basic sample S1 and 
according to minimum wage level in purchasing power parities in sample S2 and S3. The 
trade unions’ power is represented by the trade union density as percentage of all workers in 
the economy (TU). This variable was omitted in sample S2. Tax system consequences are 
reflected by total tax wedge on labor income in samples S1 and S3 (TAX). In the extended 
sample S2, this variable was replaced by implicit tax rate on labor. Finally, to reflect the 
influence of labor market policies, expenditure on active (LMPA) and passive labor market 
policies (LMPP) as percentage share of official GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
were included. Both variables on labor market policies expenditure were instrumented.
33  
Other variables describing country’s political-economic environment needed to be covered 
too to control for their potential effects besides the labor market factors that are in main focus 
of this paper. First, we control for level of country’s economic development by adding the 
variable GDP per capita in purchasing power parities (GDPPC). In line with the previous 
research, the variable is represented in logs. Furthermore, two more variables reflecting the 
degree of regulation in other fields apart from the employment protection were added: Fiscal 
freedom  indicator  has  an  inverse  relationship  to  the  overall  tax  burden  imposed  by 
government (FISF).
34 Business freedom is a quantitative measure of the ability to do business 
and has an inverse relationship to the overall burden of regulation as well as the efficiency of 
government in the regulatory process (BUSF). Finally, informality might be also affected by 
political factors such as control of corruption in the country or regulatory quality. To account 
                                                 
33 These variables might be endogenous because they relate the expenditure to the actual rate of unemployment, 
potentially affecting the decision about turning informal. For this reason we instrumented these variables by new 
variables relating the expenditure to the average unemployment rate in 5-year period before the actual year. 
34 Construction of this indicator (described in Annex 3) should guarantee existence of no colinearity between this 
variable and variable TAX. 18 
 
for  these  factors,  two  more  variables  were  added  in  the  regression  model  (CORR, 
REGQUAL).
35   
Economic theory and empirical research described in previous sections indicate expected 
effect of the variables used in our regressions. Policies that distort effective functioning  of 
labor  markets―high  minimum  wages  and  excessive  employment  protection  legislation 
―should increase  attractiveness  of the shadow  economy.  In several  instances―impact  of 
trade  unions,  labor  taxes  and  income  support  during  unemployment―neither  theory  nor 
empirical research provide unambiguous predictions, as summarized in Table 2. Pair-wise 
correlations between the dependent variables and independent variables are given in Annex 5. 
Table 2. Expected effect of explanatory variables on dependent variables 
EPL  positive 
MW  positive 
TU  positive/negative 
TAX  positive/negative 
LMPA  negative 
LMPP  positive/negative 
GDPPC  negative 
FISF  negative 
BUSF  negative 
CORR  negative 
REGQUAL  negative 
 
The basic data sample S1 covers only four NMS. Therefore it was not possible to run a 
separate analysis for this group of countries. Only the differences in the role of institutions 
between the whole group of countries and the old member countries and its implications for 
the NMS were examined using a modified Chow test (see also Cazes and Nesporova, 2003).
36 
Similar test was also applied to the extended data samples S2 and S3. These two samples 
cover more NMS which allows for running separate regressions but still, the samples suffer 
from lower data reliability given by le ss accurate and relevant indicators with different 
underlying methodology and implied limited robustness of the results. Therefore, variation 
between the NMS and old member countries might be studied only partially given the above 
mentioned limitations. 
                                                 
35 Some authors (e.g. Lehmann and Muravyev, 2009) include the macro environment and policy variables in a 
lagged form. The underlying logic is that it is reasonable to expect the outcome of interest in time t to be more 
related to the hypothesized causal variable in time t-1. In our estimations, we assume that the environment 
prevailing at the time the decision is being made has the major effect on decision-making of economic subjects 
and, therefore, we do not use lagged form of these control variables. Furthermore, there exists substantial inertia 
in development of macroeconomic and policy environments, which reduces potential differences in outcomes of 
these two approaches. Nevertheless, we considered this eventuality as well and we checked robustness of our 
results by utilization of models with lagged macro environment and policy variables. The results were not altered 
significantly by this step. 
36 We used a modified version of the test hypotheses and statistics, because number of observations in the NMS 
group is smaller than the number of parameters, nNMS < k, and thus we can not use the standard methods in this 














F (nNMS, nOE – k).  19 
 
The applied models use an aggregate approach uncovering the main correlations between 
countries’ characteristics and scope of informality. The direction of causality that we assume 
could  be  in  some  cases  subject  to  criticisms  given  the  close  mutual  interaction  between 
development of shadow economy and labor institutions, which might even be endogenous and 
their effect might vary in time.
37 The deeper explanation power of the model is rather limited 
due to the lack of relevant data. Our model is also unable to explain individual motives and 
flows  of  economic  subjects  between  formality  and  informality.  Consequently,  our  results 
should be interpreted with caution and all these limitations should be kept in mind. 
 
5.  Results of empirical estimations  
In  this  section,  we  present  results  of  our  models  estimating  the  effect  of  labor  market 
institutions  on  various  indicators  of  shadow  production  and  employment.  Pair-wise 
correlations  between  the  dependent  variables  used  in  particular  models  are  described  in 
Annex  5.  The  theory  suggests  that  dependent  variables  in  Models  1,  2  and  5  (shadow 
production, share of labor force not contributing to the pension system and share of labor 
force employed without a legal written contract) should be strongly correlated, as they have a 
tighter  relationship  to  informality.  In  contrast,  dependent  variables  of  Models  3  and  4 
(employment in small firms and self-employment) mainly reflect different phenomena and 
their relationship to examined variable―shadow employment―should be weaker. However, 
empirical evidence represented by correlation coefficients between the dependent variables in 
all  three  samples  indicates  closer  relationship  between  Models  1,  2  and  4.  Yet,  simple 
correlations still do not reveal the complexity of effects of explanatory variables in these 
models. 
Model 1 – Share of the shadow economy as percent of GDP 
Table 3 offers an overview of results of Model 1, using the shadow production as percentage 
of official GDP as dependent variable for all three samples we use. We use G2SLS random-
effects  instrumental  variables  regression  estimation  on  panel  data  for  sample  S1  and 
instrumental variables 2SLS estimation procedure on pooled data for samples S2 and S3. 
Explanation power of the models measured by R-squared varies from 28% for sample S1 to 
96% for  NMS subsample of S2. The model is  quite strong in  explaining the intra-group 
variability in the data for the S1 sample, while its ability to reflect the differences between 
countries  is  somewhat  weaker.  Samples  S2  and  S3,  which  are  used  predominantly  as 
robustness  checks,  have  higher  explanatory  power  of  regressions.  While  most  general 
political-economic variables are insignificant in the model S1 (business freedom and control 
of  corruption;  quality  of  regulation  significant  at  10%  level  only),  level  of  economic 
development significantly reduces share of the shadow sector. All labor market institutional 
variables and control variables on countries’ political-economic environment proved to be 
significant in samples S2 and S3. 
The  main  result  of  our  regression  analysis  is  an  unambiguous  confirmation  of  the 
stricter employment protection legislation positive effect on the shadow production. The 
result is significant at 1 percent level and robust across all the subsamples we use and it 
confirms our hypotheses based on previous theoretical and empirical research in this 
area. Increasing the strictness of employment protection legislation by one grade (out of 
                                                 
37 For a detailed discussion on this topic see e.g. Freeman (2007). 20 
 
six) increases the shadow production by approximately 0.34 percent GDP. The effect 
seems to be even stronger in the old member countries of the EU, where it reaches 0.71. 
Model  1  on  sample  S1  also  suggests  that  trade  union  density  decreases  shadow 
production―by 0.02 percent for each percent of trade union density increase, but the result is 
significant  at  10%  level  only.  Furthermore,  sample  S3  does  not  confirm  the  negative 
relationship between shadow economy share and trade union density, as it shows different 
estimated coefficient that varies across the subsamples. We should, thus, refrain from any 
strong conclusions on the trade unions’ role.  
The estimates of labor taxation, minimum wage and both active and passive labor market 
policy expenditure are inconclusive. The negative effect of higher level of taxation, suggested 
by the samples S2 and S3, but unconfirmed by the baseline model on sample S1, might be 
connected to the effect on improving quality of public services and provision of a better legal 
environment. Yet, the result suffers from limited robustness, as the old European subsamples 
indicate  rather  positive  effect,  which  is,  however,  insignificant  in  all  the  three  samples. 
Further, greater passive labor market policy expenditure exhibits a positive effect on shadow 
production in  sample S1 that is  significant  at  10% only.  In contrast,  samples  S2 and S3 
suggest an opposite direction of this effect. Similarly, negative effect of active labor market 
policy expenditures indicated by the sample S1 was not confirmed by results of samples S2 
and S3. While the results of both labor market policy expenditure variables are intuitive in 
case of S1, counterintuitive effects in case of the two other samples might be explained by 
potential abuse of the active LMP programs, when their participants work in shadow while 
subscribed to the programs due to low efficiency of state control over these policy measures. 
Further, negative effect  of passive  LMP might  be  driven  by  the fact  that  securing social 
income  might  increase  informal  reservation  wage  of  the  unemployed  and  reduce  shadow 
economy. Finally, the consistently, if statistically weak, negative effect of higher minimum 
wage on shadow production might result from its effect on increasing productivity in the 
formal  sector  covered  by  the  minimum  wage.  Its  negative  effect  on  shadow  economic 
activities might also stem from higher motivation of workers to find a job in formal sector 
compared to lower work remuneration in informal sector uncovered by the minimum wage.  
Shifting to the controlling variables, we find a strong and negative effect of the GDP per head 
variable on shadow economic activities. The relationship holds across all data samples and 
models. Therefore, the negative GDP effect is not entirely driven by the old-new EU members 
divide, but holds within these groups as well. However, the effect of higher GDP per head 
gets more complex when we turn to other measures of the shadow economy below, so we 
provide some tentative interpretation of the relationship between economic development and 
shadow economy measurements in the concluding chapter. Regulatory quality seems to have 
a negative effect on shadow economy production in samples S1 and S3, but results from 
sample S2 suggest that statistical robustness of coefficients is rather limited. Similarly, fiscal 
freedom also shows an inconclusive result, as it recorded a weak positive effect on shadow 
production in sample S1, as opposed to diminishing effect in sample S2.  
Remaining political-economic variables show insignificant results in the baseline sample S1 
but their effects are, however, significant in S2 and S3. Business freedom seems to increase 
the shadow economy, but the result suffers from limited robustness as it is significant in total 
sample S2 only. The effect of control of corruption seems to differ between the old Europe 
and the NMS groups. While better control of corruption seems to boost share of shadow 
production in the NMS group, it has an intuitive opposite effect in old member countries (that 
dominate overall results in samples S2 and S3). The counterintuitive result for the NMS might 
be  determined  by  the  generally  higher  level  of  corruption  prevailing  in  this  group.  The 21 
 
widespread  corruption  at  the  public  administration  system  in  new  EU  member  countries 
pushes private entrepreneurs out of the official economy and there might exist an inertia, 
preventing functioning of the traditional mechanisms prevailing in the old European group.  
Taking into account the potentially different development in NMS countries before 2004 (i.e. 
the  year  of  accession  of  ten  of  the  NMS  to  the  EU)  connected  with  the  pre-accession 
preparations and limiting our estimations to the development after 2004 only does not alter 
our  results  substantially.  Also,  limiting  our  estimations  to  the  group  of  old  EU  member 
countries only in case of  S1 and old Europe and NMS group in case of S2 and S3 does not 
affect our results or explanation power of the model significantly (with exception of variable 
control of corruption as described above). To examine the potential differences in the role of 
explanatory variables between the total country sample and old European countries subsample 
we applied modified Chow tests  as  described  above. The tests’ results  did  not  reject  the 
hypothesis  of  stability  of  regression  coefficients  between  these  two  groups  for  all  three 
samples on 5% significance level. This outcome, however, is rather inconclusive and does not 
allow for evaluating the behavior of these two groups of countries as similar.  
 
Table 3. Results of Model 1 – dependent variable SHEC 
  
S1 – Model 1.1  S2 – Model 1.2  S3 – Model 1.3 
Total  Old Europe  Total  Old Europe  NMS  Total  Old Europe  NMS 
EPL  0.3401  ***  0.7095  ***  728.5182  ***  500.3671  ***  955.4512  ***  3.9660  ***  1.1153     0.0826  *** 
MW  -0.0239     -0.0590     -1.1830  ***  -0.1684     -2.4011  ***  -0.2811     0.1267     7.5946    
TU  -0.0222  *  -0.0276                       0.0653  *  0.1323  ***  1.0378  *** 
TAX  0.0130     0.0238     -0.4076  ***  0.1910     -0.2334  ***  -0.1231  **  0.0244     -0.3370    
LMPA  -2.0053  **  -1.4154     28.8079  *  95.7827  ***  124.6775  ***  15.8518     40.2333     87.8255  *** 
LMPP  1.3975  *  0.9981     -15.2501  **  -35.8744  ***  9.0014     -11.4617     -14.6066     -197.9803  ** 
lnGDPPC  -6.6175  ***  -5.8683  ***  -7.0184  ***  -9.9472  ***  -19.5301  ***  -7.2459  ***  -9.2686  ***  -8.6823  ** 
FISF  0.0094  **  0.0072     -0.2183  ***  0.1391     -0.1407  ***  -0.0604     0.1096     -0.0240    
BUSF  -0.0006     -0.0054     0.1713  ***  0.1109     0.0585     0.0833     -0.0218     0.1114    
CORR  -0.0596     -0.2299     -10.3114  ***  -10.2124  ***  3.8823  **  -5.9614  ***  -5.2542  ***  11.9909  *** 
REGQUAL  -0.2685  *  -0.3964  *  6.6377  *  6.6252     6.5757  ***  3.9643     -2.6378     -17.9526  *** 
constant  40.2595  ***  37.8721  ***  51.6638  ***  24.4622  ***  72.2901  ***  38.1481  ***  48.5760  ***  45.7466  *** 
R sq. Within  0.8573     0.7718                                        
R sq. Between  0.2783     0.2774                                        
R sq.  0.2823     0.2791     0.8181     0.8847     0.9609     0.8103     0.8896     0.8558    
N  152     120     56     32     24     49     31     18    
groups  19     15                                        















statistics p-value  0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000    
Chow test F 
statistics p-value  0.7652  0.2348  0.3244 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. RE - random effects 
estimation procedure, POOLED IV 2SLS - pooled two stage least squares procedure with instrumental variables 
on panel data; robust standard errors utilized. The detailed description of all the models applied in our analyses 
is given in Annex 4. 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, World Bank, Heritage Foundation, IZA, own calculations. 
 
Model 2 – Share of non-contributing labor force 
Estimation of Model 2 using the share of labor force not contributing to the pension system as 
dependent variable for samples S2 and S3 (there is not enough data to estimate the model on 22 
 
sample S1) yields results summarized in Table 4. The model’s fit is quite strong: R-squared 
reached more than 80%. All explanatory variables but minimum wage and trade union density 
exhibit a significant impact on the explained variable. Similarly to Model 1, taxation of labor 
and fiscal freedom have negative impact on this proxy of shadow employment. The negative 
effect of labor taxation might be again connected to improving quality of public services and 
provision of a better legal environment in high-tax countries. Furthermore, negative effect 
was also estimated for active labor market policy expenditure and control of corruption, both 
confirming our initial hypotheses.  
On the other hand, stimulating impact on level of shadow employment was again recorded for 
employment  protection  legislation,  and  in  this  case  also  for  passive  labor  market  policy 
expenditure,  GDP  per  capita,  business  freedom  and  regulatory  quality.  As  regards 
employment protection legislation, the result confirms our initial hypothesis, although the 
outcome is significant for sample S3 only. Likewise, the estimation outcomes for business 
freedom and regulatory quality were significant for one of the two utilized samples only. 
Positive coefficient for passive labor market policies may be explained by potential abuse of 
the system, enabling both reception of unemployment benefits and simultaneous engagement 
in informal economy. The positive influence of level of economic development on the share 
of non-contributing workers seems to contradict results of Model 1 and previous economic 
research. Potential explanation of this  counterintuitive result is  that increasingly  generous 
pension benefits, unrelated to life-time contributions to the system, made contributing to the 
pension systems in rich European countries redundant as the eventual pensions reflect non-
contributing periods only partially. Yet, this result must be taken carefully and should be 
subjected to further research. 
In case of this explanatory variable, we also examined the possibility that our results might be 
biased by adjustment of the dependent variable for the unemployment rate. This might happen 
for instance if people were working informally and declaring themselves unemployed in order 
to  receive benefits  as  is indicated by  above-mentioned regression coefficients  for passive 
labor market policies. However, analysis of unadjusted data  yields very similar results to 
those presented in Table 4.
38  
Due to limited data available, we were not able to examine differences between old European 
countries and NMS group.  
 
Table 4. Results of Model 2 – dependent variable CONTRIB 
                                                 
38 Regression estimation results for the share of labor force not contributing to the pension system unadjusted for 
the unemployment rate used as dependent variable are available from the authors upon request. 
  
S2 – Model 2.2  S3 – Model 2.3 
Total  Total 
EPL  222.1883     9.4872  ** 
MW  -0.7356     0.0106    
TU        0.2190  * 
TAX  -0.4715  ***  -0.3733  ** 
LMPA  -127.6588  ***  -138.9402  *** 
LMPP  36.2993  ***  63.5549  *** 
lnGDPPC  19.5971  ***  16.0823  *** 
FISF  -0.3434  ***  -0.1456  *** 
BUSF  0.3849  ***  0.0196    
CORR  -18.2655  ***  -21.1944  *** 
REGQUAL  13.9020     25.5393  *** 
Constant  -41.0798  **  -54.3431  ** 23 
 
 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. IV 2SLS - two stage least 
squares procedure with instrumental variables on cross-sectional sample; robust standard errors utilized. The 
detailed description of all the models applied in our analyses is given in Annex 4. 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, World Bank, Heritage Foundation, IZA, own calculations. 
 
Models 3 and 4 – Small firms and self-employed 
Models 3 and 4 analyze effects of labor market institutions on the share of workers in small 
firms  (employing  fewer  than  ten  employees)  and  share  of  self-employed.  Both  measures 
should reflect labor market restrictions that presumably push workers into self-employment or 
prevent firms to expand beyond certain size, approximated here by the number of employees. 
Table 5 and 6 offer estimation outcomes of Model 3 and Model 4 for all three samples. The 
results indicate that our model explain the two chosen indicators weakly, particularly in case 
of Model 4 (self-employers). The poor explanatory power of regressions is probably caused 
by much more complex relationship between the labor market indicators chosen as dependent 
variables and the size of the shadow economy  or shadow employment, as it was already 
discussed in previous sections of our paper. 
Results  of  Model  3  are  not  statistically  very  robust,  despite  explaining  a  solid  part  of 
variability  in  dependent  variable  (R-squared  reaching  from  35%  to  90%).  Moreover,  the 
Model 3 results are not consistent with results of Models 1, 2 and 5 (see also below). As in 
Models 1 and 2, the strictness of employment protection legislation seems to have a positive 
effect on indicators of shadow economy―with every grade of EPL strictness, the share of 
employment in small firms increases by almost 10 percent.  
Level of labor taxation seems to reduce share of small firms’ employment in the labor force, 
confirming the apparent negative relationship between shadow market indicators and labor 
taxation detected in models 1 and 2.
39 Effect of passive labor market policy expenditures is 
ambiguous; business freedom tends to increase employment in small firms. Effects of other 
variables―trade  union  density,  active  labor  market  policy  expenditures,  minimum  wage, 
economic  development,  fiscal  freedom,  control  of  corruption,  and  regulatory  quality―are 
statistically insignificant in baseline sample S1. In samples S2 and S3, active labor market 
policy expenditures seem to have a negative effect on employment in small firms in new 
member states, but it has insignificant effects in old EU member states. Further, minimum 
wage exhibits a negative effect on the dependent variable, which might be a reasonable 
result for pure legal employment in small companies, but fails to meet our hypotheses 
regarding the effect on shadow employment, similarly to results of previous models.  
Results of Model 4 relating the development of explanatory variables to self-employers proxy 
of  shadow  employment  are  not  robust  and  the  effect  of  independent  variables  (mostly 
significant) varies a lot between the particular samples and subsamples to which the model 
was applied. 
                                                 
39 We examined this relationship further by utilization of more specific dependent variable stating the share of 
labor force employed in firms with fewer than five employees, which should have a closer relationship to 
examined shadow employment. The source of these figures was EU-SILC and they concern time period 2005-
2007. Regression estimation results confirmed the negative relationship between employment in small firms and 
labor taxation. The results thus stay inconclusive as regards the effect of this variable on shadow employment. 
Regression estimation results for the share of labor force employed in firms with fewer than five employees used 
as dependent variable are available from the authors upon request. 
R sq.  0.8007     0.8601    
N  18     17    
Method  IV 2SLS  IV 2SLS 
Wald test Chi
2 statistics p-value  0.0000     0.0000    24 
 
Examining the potential differences in the role of explanatory variables between the NMS and 
old European countries by the modified Chow tests, we were not able to reject the hypothesis 
of stability of regression coefficients between these two groups of countries in all the sub-
models of Models 3 and 4 but Model 4 on sample S1.   
 
Table 5. Results of Model 3 – dependent variable LESS10 
  
S1 – Model 3.1  S2 – Model 3.2  S3 – Model 3.3 
Total  Old Europe  Total  Old Europe  NMS  Total  Old Europe  NMS 
EPL  9.5992  ***  11.6807  ***  -14.3667     -2111.9680  **  -1044.6590  ***  6.1988  ***  16.9680  *  -5.3567  *** 
MW  -1.0595     -2.0185     -4.4364  ***  -4.3909  **  -3.4194  *  -3.1874  **  -4.0462  **  -5.7700  ** 
TU  -0.0164     0.0450                       -0.0516     0.1096     0.5342  *** 
TAX  -0.2569     -0.4995  **  -0.8584  ***  -2.8924  ***  0.2956     -0.7366  **  -2.1621  *  -0.1829    
LMPA  43.2387     -0.3349     43.7352     -52.3072     -110.8614  **  -54.5490     -388.9695  *  -79.3016  *** 
LMPP  -43.4472  **  -20.1008     -32.9602     49.0924     74.2611     -2.2491     133.0819  *  455.4081  *** 
lnGDPPC  6.9031     13.9637     34.0757  ***  63.4543  ***  11.8531     19.0370  **  59.6104     -2.5173    
FISF  -0.0524     -0.1028     0.0822     0.3677     0.1149     -0.2703  *  -1.1172     0.2014  ** 
BUSF  0.3234  ***  0.3345  ***  0.3385     1.5403  ***  0.1287     0.2060     0.6140     -0.1992  * 
CORR  -5.9810     -8.3002  *  1.4953     36.7892  ***  4.5089     -4.9543     -9.8134     -9.3639  * 
REGQUAL  4.5365     2.3194     -35.2486  **  -145.9063  ***  -10.5129  ***  -8.3761     -11.8015     28.4193  *** 
Constant  -20.0245     -31.3592     -32.0524     -46.7966     -6.9510     12.6085     -63.2875     8.6908    
R sq. Within  0.1336     0.1257                                        
R sq. Between  0.5686     0.7480                                        
R sq.  0.3464     0.4208     0.4632     0.7259     0.8980     0.3497     0.3454     0.7602    
N  143     112     53     31     22     48     30     18    
Groups  19     15                                        
Method  RE  RE 
POOLED IV 










value  0.0018     0.0001     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0009     0.0042     0.0000    
Chow test F 
statistics p-
value  0.9479  0.9992  0.9985 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. RE - random effects 
generalized least squares estimation method, POOLED IV 2SLS - pooled two stage least squares procedure with 
instrumental variables on panel data; robust standard errors utilized. The detailed description of all the models 
applied in our analyses is given in Annex 4. 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, World Bank, Heritage Foundation, IZA, own calculations. 
 
Table 6. Results of Model 4 – dependent variable SELFEMPL 
  
S1 – Model 4.1  S2 – Model 4.2  S3 – Model 4.3 
Total  Old Europe  Total  Old Europe  NMS  Total  Old Europe  NMS 
EPL  -0.5499     0.9708  *  83.5359  **  -339.8728  **  902.4133  ***  2.1267  *  1.7783  **  2.0232    
MW  -0.0558     0.2647     -0.7486     0.3260     1.9215     0.0258     -0.1448     1.2082    
TU  -0.0967  **  -0.0381                       0.0723  *  0.0722  **  -0.1344    
TAX  0.0083     -0.0633     -0.4235  ***  0.3509  ***  0.1803     -0.3400  ***  -0.1236  *  0.2239    
LMPA  2.0591     4.5337     -56.0010  ***  78.0071  ***  -25.2625     -81.4802  ***  -10.0164     -37.7993    
LMPP  -1.9254     -6.9724  **  28.6895  ***  -29.0602  ***  187.4907  ***  35.6506  ***  5.0697     15.1356    
lnGDPPC  -3.6395  ***  -8.6731  ***  4.7138  ***  -15.7035  ***  -5.8213  *  4.9850  **  -8.5828  ***  1.4612    
FISF  0.0545  ***  0.0372     -0.2426  ***  0.4481  ***  0.2494  *  -0.1727  ***  0.1274  **  0.0156    
BUSF  0.0024     0.0275  **  0.0756  ***  -0.3247  ***  -0.2684  ***  0.0160     -0.0262     -0.0744    
CORR  0.6946     -2.9335  ***  -6.8451  ***  -3.3139  *  -10.8332  ***  -6.6594  ***  -9.5263  ***  -2.2346    
REGQUAL  0.9451     0.6155     -2.1653     3.1040     5.7631  **  -0.6917  ***  7.8841  **  -8.8696    
constant  24.6757  ***  45.8326  ***  32.9592  ***  63.2909  ***  -4.1078     23.8789  ***  41.8845  ***  9.1444    
R sq. Within  0.2055     0.0881                                        
R sq. Between  0.0666     0.7635                                        25 
 
R sq.  0.0761     0.7565     0.5825     0.9201     0.8192     0.5790     0.9009     0.7119    
N  149     118     54     32     22     49     31     18    
groups  19     15                                        
Method  RE  RE 
POOLED IV 












value  0.0022     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000    
Chow test F 
statistics p-
value  0.0000  0.8832  0.9534 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. RE - random effects 
generalized least squares estimation method, POOLED IV 2SLS - pooled two stage least squares procedure with 
instrumental variables on panel data; robust standard errors utilized. The detailed description of all the models 
applied in our analyses is given in Annex 4. 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, World Bank, Heritage Foundation, IZA, own calculations. 
 
Model 5 – Share of workers without a legal contract 
The last model that we examine is Model 5 with share of labor force employed without a legal 
written contract as a dependent variable, the results of which are summarized in Table 7. The 
results of this model are close to Models 1 and 2 (in contrast with Models 3 and 4). The 
explanation power of the model is solid, explaining more than 40% of variability in dependent 
variable on S2 and S3. However, the explanation power of the model is rather weak for S1 (R-
squared below 11%) and its fit measured by the Wald test is poor for old European subsample 
of S1 indicating joint insignificance of the regression coefficients. For this reason, we omit 
the results  of  the S1  sample from  further analysis and discussion and we concentrate on 
samples S2 and S3. Their explanation power measured by the R-squared is higher for the 
NMS group, while their ability to describe the variability in the old European subsample is 
lower (see Table 7).  
All  the  labor  market  institutional  variables  and  factors  related  to  political-economic 
environment  of  the  countries  proved  to  be  significant  in  the  model.  The  employment 
protection  legislation  coefficient  is  again  positive,  indicating  that  the  excessive  legal 
protection leads to a higher share of workers who have no legal written contract. The result is 
intuitive both given the variable’s literal meaning―share of workers on temporary contracts 
and without any legal contract, i.e. workers not protected by strong EPL―and its role as a 
proxy for shadow employment. It is also consistent with similar effect of the EPL in Models 1 
and 2.   
Other indicators show weaker effects. Level of labor taxes seems again to diminish shadow 
economy indicator, in this model share of workers without a contract. The same effect has a 
higher trade union density, as trade unions may exercise pressure on government to impose 
harsher penalties for non-contract workers. Higher minimum wage seems to increase the 
share of workers without the contract, but only in the new EU members subsample. 
Labor market policy expenditures, both passive and active, have ambiguous effects on non-
contract employment. 
Out of the other control variables, only fiscal freedom and business freedom seem to have a 
consistent―negative―effect  on  the  dependent  variable.  Level  of  economic  development 
measured by GDP per capita tends to reduce shadow employment, but the robustness of this 
outcome  is  limited  to  S2  only.  Control  of  corruption,  level  of  economic  development 
measured by GDP per capita and regulatory quality all show statistically weak effects. 26 
 
The extended data samples S2 and S3 allow us to run separate regressions for NMS group and 
old European countries. Although the estimated coefficients suggest different behavior of the 
two groups of countries, the results of applied Chow tests do not allow for rejection of the 
hypothesis of stability of regression coefficients between these two groups of countries in 
either of the sub-models.   
 
Table 7. Results of Model 5– dependent variable CONTRACT 
  
S1 – Model 5.1  S2 – Model 5.2  S3 – Model 5.3 
Total  Old Europe  Total  Old Europe  NMS  Total  Old Europe  NMS 
EPL  4.1585  ***  0.0980     562.1071  ***  653.9701  ***  499.0793  ***  2.7880  **  6.5737  ***  6.9879  *** 
MW  -0.5562  *  -0.2438     -0.1224     -0.0793     4.6800  ***  -0.0925     -0.4403     6.2950  ** 
TU  -0.1036  *  -0.0752                       -0.1006  *  -0.0865  **  -0.5563  *** 
TAX  0.1701  *  0.0614     -0.3391  **  -0.4405     -0.8808  ***  -0.1898  **  -0.2152     -0.2119    
LMPA  5.5891     -6.2919     -33.2684  **  -26.3724     114.2258  ***  -20.5066     -15.8073     44.6655    
LMPP  -1.3019     4.9171     13.3768  **  17.5201     49.1185     -1.8657     -0.3121     -160.8801    
lnGDPPC  4.7619  **  -3.0364     -4.6410  **  -4.0338     -7.8942  ***  -1.5095     -8.8021     0.9432    
FISF  0.0340     -0.0020     -0.3544  ***  -0.2476     -0.2773  **  -0.2135  ***  -0.1099     -0.4078  ** 
BUSF  -0.0075     0.0354  **  -0.2533  ***  0.0556     -0.5684  ***  -0.0381     0.1100  *  -0.2582  * 
CORR  -2.9826  ***  -0.6461     4.4729  *  4.5274  *  1.2196     5.4242  **  4.0122  *  3.7078    
REGQUAL  1.9812     0.0067     -4.1349     -10.8420     6.8003  **  -4.1791     2.2713     -11.2454    
constant  -17.8050  **  19.8145     70.7803  ***  46.6566  **  93.1514  ***  35.6348  ***  27.7419  ***  61.5898  *** 
R sq. Within  0.3339     0.1382                                        
Rsq. Between  0.1076     0.0676                                        
R sq.  0.1058     0.0612     0.6150     0.6108     0.9269     0.4100     0.5604     0.7847    
N  146     115     53     31     22     49     31     18    
groups  19     15                                        














p-value  0.0000     0.1843     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000     0.0000    
Chow test F 
statistics p-
value  0.1582  0.9462  0.9994 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. RE - random effects 
generalized least squares estimation method, POOLED IV 2SLS - pooled two stage least squares procedure with 
instrumental variables on panel data; robust standard errors utilized. The detailed description of all the models 
applied in our analyses is given in Annex 4. 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, World Bank, Heritage Foundation, IZA, own calculations. 
 
6.  Conclusions  
Several estimation approaches for different data samples and explanatory variables were used 
in this paper to analyze the impact of labor market institutions on the development of shadow 
production and employment in European countries. The presented results for different model 
specifications show that the most robust estimation outcomes come from specifications that 
use as dependent variables the shadow economy as percentage share on overall official GDP, 
the share of labor force not contributing to the pension system and the share of labor force 
employed  without  a  legal  written  contract.  Models  explaining  the  share  of  labor  force 
employed in small firms with fewer than ten employees or being self-employers do not offer 
robust  results,  as  the    two  indicators  proxy  shadow  employment  only  weakly  and  are 
influenced  by  other  factors  and  patterns  of  development.  Our  findings  also  confirm  that 
availability of relevant data related to the shadow economy and employment for European 27 
 
countries as it is being processed and published by Eurostat is a serious obstacle in examining 
this issue.   
Despite giving more consistent and robust results, the three models (Model 1, 2 and 5) have 
also substantial shortcomings as was discussed in previous sections. Generally, the robustness 
of the results is partially limited by the character of data available. Still, no better indicators 
are recently available and our results do allow us to claim that the development of shadow 
sector  in  European  countries  in  period  2000-2007  was  significantly  affected  by  the 
development of labor market institutional environment. While the effect of some institutions 
proved to be straightforward and corresponds with our initial hypotheses based on previous 
theoretical and empirical research, some of the variables showed a rather ambiguous impact. 
Our  results  confirm  economic  theory  and  previous  empirical  analyses  that  stricter 
employment protection legislation tends to stimulate shadow production and employment. 
The EPL coefficient is the most consistent across the models and sub-samples and indicates 
that countries with stricter legislation that makes labor markets more rigid and cumbersome 
will indeed end up with a larger shadow sector, no matter how measured.  
Effects  of  other  variables  are  less  unambiguous  and  statistically  robust.  The  higher  trade 
union density effect is not clear, as the sign of the regression coefficient differs across models 
and samples. Theoretically, both negative and positive effects of trade unionization might be 
justified. The negative influence of unions on shadow employment may reflect their strength 
in preventing more flexible forms of employment to be offered by firms, while the positive 
effect would be consistent with the ―insider vs. outsider‖ arguments: unionized labor fights to 
keep expensive benefits and tends to increase labor costs, that makes it difficult for employers 
to offer formal employment. Our empirical results do not provide a robust answer to this 
dilemma.  
Similarly, larger passive labor market policy expenditure has an ambiguous effect on shadow 
production and tends to increase  shadow  employment. Effects  of the  active labor market 
policy expenditures are almost opposite to the passive ones. They tend to reduce shadow 
employment in general and in the old European sample in particular, but the NMS group 
seems to register an opposite direction of this effect. The effect on shadow production is, 
again, ambiguous. The positive effect of labor market policies in general might be determined 
by potential inefficiency in their provision, enabling people and firms to simultaneously take 
part in the programs and engage in informal activities as well. In contrast, negative impact on 
reducing shadow economy might stem from improved efficiency of labor market functioning 
and better job-matching process.  
Minimum  wage  also  exhibited  ambiguous  impact  on  shadow  economic  activities  in  our 
estimations.  Generally,  negative  influence  on  shadow  production  tends  to  prevail,  but 
robustness of this finding is limited by significantly positive effect on shadow employment 
registered in the NMS group. Theoretically, positive effect on shadow employment would be 
expected driven by adverse effects of the minimum wage in terms of formal employment 
potential of low-productivity workers. Yet, the negative effect on shadow production might 
result from its potential pressure towards productivity increases in the formal sector covered 
by the minimum wage. 
Last of the labor market institutional variables, taxation of labor, proved to have a significant 
negative  impact  on  shadow  employment.  The  counterintuitive  negative  result  was  also 
reported in several previous studies on shadow economy using comparable tax variables (for a 28 
 
detailed study see e.g. Friedman et al., 2000) and might be explained by the positive effect of 
higher  taxation  on  improving  quality  of  public  services  and  provision  of  a  better  legal 
environment, offsetting  the potential impact on lower motivation of economic subjects to 
engagement in formal sector. In our sample, moreover, several low-income countries with 
larger shadow economies have lowered their taxes recently, and their low income and large 
informal sector are not consequences of low taxes, but rather of a long socialist experiment 
(characterized,  among  others,  by  high  taxes).  The  effect  of  labor  taxation  on  shadow 
production is not clear in our results. 
Further, our results show that the level of economic development measured by GDP per capita 
has a significant negative impact on shadow production in Europe. This finding is in line with 
previous  economic  research  on  this  topic.  However,  the  effect  of  this  factor  on  shadow 
employment is not clear, as the results differ across the models. While a similar, negative 
influence  was  registered  for  shadow  employment  proxied  by  the  share  of  labor  force 
employed without a legal written contract, opposite direction of this effect seems to be the 
case for shadow employment  proxied by  the share of labor  force not  contributing to the 
pension  system.  Positive  effect  contradicts  results  of  previous  economic  research  on  this 
topic.  Potential  explanation  of  this  counterintuitive  result  is  that  increasingly  generous 
pension benefits, unrelated to life-time contributions to the system, made contributing to the 
pension systems in rich European countries redundant as the eventual pensions reflect non-
contributing periods only partially. Yet, this result must be taken carefully and should be 
subjected to further research. 
Among the variables describing political environment of the European countries, larger fiscal 
freedom proved to have a significant impact on reducing shadow employment. Apparently, 
lower fiscal burden imposed by the countries is connected with smaller incentive for informal 
behavior. This finding seems to contradict the labor taxes result, but labor taxation is only one 
of three components of fiscal freedom that takes into account also corporate income taxation 
and  total  tax  revenue  as  a  percentage  of  GDP.  The  effect  of  this  variable  on  shadow 
production is ambiguous in our analyses. 
Furthermore, the effects of level of business freedom and regulatory quality proved to be 
ambiguous in our analyses as the estimated coefficients are not robust in different model 
specifications. Finally, the effect of control of corruption seems to differ between the old 
Europe and the NMS groups. While better control of corruption seems to boost share of 
shadow production in the NMS group, it has an opposite effect in old member countries. The 
counterintuitive outcome for the NMS group suggests that the development in post-socialist 
countries (NMS group) may have a different nature than in more ―traditional‖ developing 
countries,  where  the  negative  relationship  between  control  of  corruption  and  informality 
prevails in empirical literature. Countries in our sample were generally reducing the role of 
the state during their development, as their set out to reform their former centrally-planned 
system. This state retrenchment, often compounded by mass-scale privatization, increases the 
space available for informal sector and provided motivation for informal private sector to 
expand. Our results should, therefore, be interpreted carefully and in context of economic 
transition that took place in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, one has to bear in mind 
substantial shortcomings of the data utilized in our estimations, as was described in the paper. 
Results of applied Chow tests examining the potential differences in the role of explanatory 
variables between the NMS and old European countries are inconclusive. Generally, we were 
not  able to  reject  the hypothesis  of stability of regression coefficients  between these two 
groups of countries in all the tested models. Yet, some of the estimated coefficients suggest 29 
 
different behavior of the two groups of countries but with the data available, we were not able 
to study this issue in detail and it remains open to further research. 30 
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Annex 1 – Statistics on shadow economy 
 
Shadow economy in Europe: % of official GDP, 1999-2007 
 
Years  Country 
average  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Austria  10.0  9.8  9.7  9.8  9.8  9.8  9.8  9.6  9.5  9.8 
Belgium  22.7  22.2  22.1  22.0  22.0  21.8  21.8  21.4  21.3  21.9 
Bulgaria  37.3  36.9  36.6  36.1  35.6  34.9  34.1  33.5  32.7  35.3 
Cyprus  29.2  28.7  28.2  27.8  28.2  28.1  27.7  27.3  26.5  28.0 
Czech Republic  19.3  19.1  18.9  18.8  18.7  18.4  17.8  17.3  17.0  18.4 
Denmark  18.4  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  17.8  17.6  17.0  16.9  17.7 
Estonia  -  32.7  32.4  32.0  31.4  31.1  30.5  29.8  29.5  31.2 
Finland  18.4  18.1  17.9  17.8  17.7  17.6  17.4  17.1  17.0  17.7 
France  15.7  15.2  15.0  15.1  15.0  14.9  14.8  14.8  14.7  15.0 
Germany  16.4  16.0  15.9  16.1  16.3  16.1  16.0  15.6  15.3  16.0 
Greece  28.5  28.7  28.2  28.0  27.4  27.1  26.9  26.4  26.5  27.5 
Hungary  25.4  25.1  24.8  24.5  24.4  24.1  24.0  23.7  23.7  24.4 
Ireland  16.1  15.9  15.9  15.9  16.0  15.8  15.6  15.5  15.4  15.8 
Italy  27.8  27.1  26.7  26.8  27.0  27.0  27.1  26.9  26.8  27.0 
Latvia  30.8  30.5  30.1  29.8  29.4  29.0  28.4  27.7  27.2  29.2 
Lithuania  33.8  33.7  33.3  32.8  32.0  31.7  31.0  30.4  29.7  32.0 
Luxembourg  10.0  9.8  9.8  9.8  9.8  9.8  9.7  9.6  9.4  9.7 
Malta  27.4  27.1  27.3  27.3  27.5  27.6  27.3  27.0  26.5  27.2 
Netherlands  13.3  13.1  13.1  13.2  13.3  13.2  13.2  13.2  13.0  13.2 
Norway  19.2  19.1  19.0  19.0  19.0  18.5  18.5  18.2  18.0  18.7 
Poland  27.7  27.6  27.7  27.7  27.5  27.3  26.9  26.4  26.0  27.2 
Portugal  23.0  22.7  22.6  22.7  23.0  23.1  23.3  23.2  23.0  23.0 
Romania  34.3  34.4  33.7  33.5  32.8  32.0  31.7  30.7  30.2  32.6 
Slovak Republic  18.9  18.9  18.8  18.6  18.3  18.1  17.6  17.2  16.8  18.1 
Slovenia  27.3  27.1  26.7  26.6  26.4  26.2  25.8  25.3  24.7  26.2 
Spain  23.0  22.7  22.4  22.4  22.4  22.5  22.4  22.4  22.2  22.5 
Sweden  19.6  19.2  19.1  19.0  18.7  18.5  18.6  18.2  17.9  18.8 
United Kingdom  12.8  12.7  12.6  12.6  12.5  12.4  12.4  12.3  12.2  12.5 
Source: Schneider et al. (2010) 
 
 
Informal employment in Europe: share of labor force not contributing to pension system 
(%) adjusted for the unemployment rate, 2007 
  
Labor force without pension 
system contributions (%) 
Unemployment rate 
(%) 
Labor force without pension system 
contributions (%), adjusted for 
unemployment rate 
Austria  11.06  4.40  6.66 
Belgium  21.49  7.50  13.99 
Bulgaria  n.a.  6.90  n.a. 
Cyprus  20.26  4.00  16.26 
Czech Republic  15.17  5.30  9.87 
Denmark  5.95  3.80  2.15 
Estonia  10.34  4.70  5.64 
Finland  10.85  6.90  3.95 
France  n.a.  8.40  n.a. 
Germany  n.a.  8.40  n.a. 
Greece  38.60  8.30  30.30 
Hungary  14.45  7.40  7.05 
Ireland  23.32  4.60  18.72 
Italy  23.57  6.10  17.47 
Latvia  15.85  6.00  9.85 
Lithuania  n.r.  4.30  n.r. 
Luxembourg  n.r.  4.20  n.r. 
Malta  n.a.  6.40  n.a. 
Netherlands  6.79  3.20  3.59 34 
 
Norway  6.44  2.50  3.94 
Poland  n.r.  9.60  n.r. 
Portugal  n.r.  8.10  n.r. 
Romania  n.a.  6.40  n.a. 
Slovak Republic  16.53  11.10  5.43 
Slovenia  10.90  4.90  6.00 
Spain  24.00  8.30  15.70 
Sweden  6.88  6.10  0.78 
United Kingdom  n.r.  5.30  n.r. 
 Source: Eurostat: European Union-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), own calculations 
Note: n.a. – data not available, n.r. – data not reliable due to divergent development in time or too low value 
compared with the unemployment rate. 
 
 
Informal employment in Europe: share of labor force working in small firms or being self-
employed (%), 2006-2007 
  
Workers in firms with less 
than 10 employees  
(% of labor force) 
Self-employers 
(% of labor force) 
2006  2007  2006  2007 
Austria  30.09  30.28  11.48  11.43 
Belgium  19.84  19.38  12.42  12.52 
Bulgaria  18.47  18.66  10.80  10.47 
Cyprus  37.82  38.89  18.43  17.90 
Czech Republic  23.54  22.92  14.36  14.74 
Denmark  21.15  20.86  8.04  8.18 
Estonia  18.21  18.17  7.37  8.32 
Finland  28.56  28.41  11.31  11.64 
France  25.41  25.74  9.37  9.24 
Germany  21.17  20.94  10.10  10.02 
Greece  46.60  47.24  27.20  26.91 
Hungary  25.26  26.57  11.27  11.06 
Ireland  27.31  n.a.  15.17  15.65 
Italy  31.83  31.98  22.90  22.78 
Latvia  25.52  32.57  9.33  8.62 
Lithuania  16.97  15.86  12.58  11.42 
Luxembourg  15.43  17.95  7.29  6.78 
Malta  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Netherlands  17.24  17.38  11.88  12.05 
Norway  95.05  96.35  7.89  7.44 
Poland  20.36  21.34  17.14  17.39 
Portugal  33.12  33.59  21.47  21.58 
Romania  23.89  23.80  19.20  19.82 
Slovak Republic  27.70  27.66  10.90  11.41 
Slovenia  22.04  20.78  10.65  10.57 
Spain  33.77  32.98  15.12  15.26 
Sweden  21.75  21.70  9.69  9.68 
United Kingdom  19.39  19.59  12.06  12.28 
 Source: Eurostat: Labor Force Surveys, own calculations 
Note: n.a. – data not available. 
 
Informal  employment in Europe: share of labor  force employed on temporary contract 
basis or without a legal contract (%), 2001-2007 
 
Years   Country 
average  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Austria  7.05  6.43  6.25  8.23  7.88  7.81  7.62  7.32 
Belgium  7.46  6.45  7.25  7.41  7.51  7.41  7.37  7.27 
Bulgaria  5.58  4.95  5.33  6.64  5.46  5.40  4.50  5.41 
Czech Republic  6.90  6.95  7.62  7.92  7.26  7.30  7.20  7.31 35 
 
Denmark  8.48  8.05  8.59  8.96  8.97  8.08  7.95  8.44 
Estonia  2.65  2.08  2.73  2.72  2.45  2.53  1.94  2.44 
Finland  15.58  15.01  15.59  14.95  15.87  15.68  14.39  15.30 
France  13.31  12.67  11.92  11.61  12.61  12.91  13.20  12.60 
Germany  ..  10.87  11.01  11.17  12.60  12.29  12.83  11.80 
Greece  8.12  7.16  6.91  7.88  7.52  6.79  6.99  7.34 
Hungary  6.44  6.47  6.47  5.92  6.07  5.88  6.39  6.23 
Ireland  3.79  4.00  3.85  2.79  n.a.  n.a.  7.47  4.38 
Italy  6.88  7.16  6.92  8.55  8.98  9.67  9.77  8.28 
Latvia  6.06  10.05  8.24  7.94  7.43  6.33  3.73  7.11 
Lithuania  5.26  5.98  6.38  5.37  4.61  3.80  3.06  4.92 
Luxembourg  4.04  3.95  2.88  4.40  4.86  5.59  6.33  4.58 
Netherlands  12.64  12.66  12.81  12.80  13.55  13.57  14.70  13.25 
Norway  8.39  9.38  8.78  9.41  8.82  9.68  9.38  9.12 
Poland  8.60  11.13  13.82  16.58  19.05  20.65  21.59  15.92 
Portugal  14.41  15.69  15.03  14.72  14.51  15.53  16.88  15.25 
Romania  1.61  0.55  1.28  1.79  1.55  1.20  1.06  1.29 
Slovak Republic  4.60  4.37  4.49  4.82  4.35  4.47  4.42  4.50 
Slovenia  10.83  12.33  11.75  15.20  14.76  14.47  15.57  13.56 
Spain  25.61  25.90  25.98  26.25  27.28  26.94  24.99  26.14 
Sweden  14.08  13.98  14.14  14.04  11.73  12.87  13.12  13.42 
United Kingdom  5.98  5.45  5.15  5.06  4.87  4.93  5.08  5.22 
Source: Eurostat: Labor Force Surveys, own calculations 
Note: n.a. – data not available. 
 
 
Comparison  of  indicators:  shadow  production  (%  of  GDP)  vs.  shadow  employment  in 
Europe  (share  of  labor  force  not  contributing  to  pension  system  adjusted  for  the 
unemployment rate, %), 2007 
  
Labor force without pension 
system contributions (%) 
(CONTRIB) 









Austria  6.7  9.5  9  1  8 
Belgium  14.0  21.3  13  10  3 
Cyprus  16.3  26.5  15  14  1 
Czech Republic  9.9  17.0  12  6  6 
Denmark  2.1  16.9  2  5  -3 
Estonia  5.6  29.5  7  18  -11 
Finland  4.0  17.0  5  6  -1 
Greece  30.3  26.5  18  14  4 
Hungary  7.0  23.7  10  12  -2 
Ireland  18.7  15.4  17  3  14 
Italy  17.5  26.8  16  16  0 
Latvia  9.9  27.2  11  17  -6 
Netherlands  3.6  13.0  3  2  1 
Norway  3.9  18.0  4  9  -5 
Slovak Republic  5.4  16.8  6  4  2 
Slovenia  6.0  24.7  8  13  -5 
Spain  15.7  22.2  14  11  3 
Sweden  0.8  17.9  1  8  -7 
Source: Schneider et al. (2010), Eurostat: European Union-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC), own calculations 





Annex 2 – Labor institutional variables – development in European countries in 2000-
2007  
 
Implicit tax rate on labor incomes (%), 2000-2007 










(2) - (1) 
Austria  40.1  40.6  40.8  40.8  41.0  40.8  40.8  41.0  40.7  40.5  40.9  0.4 
Belgium  43.9  43.5  43.6  43.4  44.0  43.8  42.7  42.3  43.4  43.7  42.9  -0.7 
Bulgaria  38.7  34.3  32.9  35.5  36.3  34.7  30.6  29.9  34.1  35.3  31.7  -3.6 
Cyprus  21.5  22.8  22.2  22.7  22.7  24.5  24.1  24.0  23.1  22.2  24.2  2.0 
Czech Republic  40.7  40.3  41.2  41.4  41.8  41.7  41.1  41.4  41.2  40.7  41.4  0.7 
Denmark  41.0  40.8  38.8  38.1  37.5  37.1  37.1  37.0  38.4  40.2  37.1  -3.1 
Estonia  37.8  37.3  37.8  36.9  36.1  34.1  33.9  33.8  36.0  37.6  33.9  -3.7 
Finland  44.1  44.1  43.8  42.5  41.5  41.5  41.6  41.4  42.6  44.0  41.5  -2.5 
France  42.1  41.7  41.2  41.5  41.4  41.9  41.9  41.3  41.6  41.7  41.7  0.0 
Germany  40.7  40.5  40.4  40.4  39.2  38.8  39.0  39.0  39.8  40.5  38.9  -1.6 
Greece  34.5  34.6  34.4  35.6  33.7  34.2  35.1  35.5  34.7  34.5  34.9  0.4 
Hungary  41.4  40.9  41.2  39.3  38.3  38.4  38.8  41.2  39.9  41.2  39.5  -1.7 
Ireland  28.5  27.4  26.0  25.0  26.3  25.4  25.4  25.7  26.2  27.3  25.5  -1.8 
Italy  43.7  43.6  43.5  43.4  43.1  42.9  42.5  44.0  43.3  43.6  43.1  -0.5 
Latvia  36.7  36.5  37.8  36.6  36.7  33.2  33.1  31.0  35.2  37.0  32.4  -4.6 
Lithuania  41.2  40.2  38.1  36.9  36.0  34.9  33.6  32.3  36.7  39.8  33.6  -6.2 
Luxembourg   29.9  29.6  28.3  29.3  29.5  30.4  30.7  31.2  29.9  29.3  30.8  1.5 
Malta  20.6  21.4  20.8  20.4  21.0  21.3  21.3  20.1  20.9  20.9  20.9  0.0 
Netherlands  34.5  30.6  30.9  31.5  31.4  31.6  34.6  34.3  32.4  32.0  33.5  1.5 
Norway  n.a.  n.a.  38.7  39.0  39.2  38.5  37.9  37.8  38.5  38.7  38.1  -0.6 
Poland  33.6  33.2  32.4  32.7  32.7  33.1  34.2  35.0  33.4  33.1  34.1  1.0 
Portugal  27.0  27.4  27.6  27.8  27.9  28.1  28.6  30.0  28.1  27.3  28.9  1.6 
Romania  32.2  31.8  31.1  29.5  28.9  28.0  30.4  30.1  30.3  31.7  29.5  -2.2 
Slovakia  36.3  37.1  36.7  36.1  34.5  32.9  30.5  30.9  34.4  36.7  31.4  -5.3 
Slovenia  37.7  37.5  37.6  37.7  37.5  37.6  37.4  36.9  37.5  37.6  37.3  -0.3 
Spain  28.7  29.5  29.8  29.9  29.9  30.3  30.8  31.6  30.1  29.3  30.9  1.6 
Sweden  47.2  46.2  44.8  44.7  44.7  45.0  44.5  43.1  45.0  46.1  44.2  -1.9 
United Kingdom  25.3  25.0  24.1  24.3  24.8  25.5  25.8  26.1  25.1  24.8  25.8  1.0 
Total average  35.9  35.5  35.2  35.1  34.9  34.7  34.6  34.6  35.1  35.5  34.6  -1.0 
Old Europe 
average  36.7  36.3  36.0  36.1  35.9  36.0  36.2  36.3  36.2  36.5  36.2  -0.3 
NMS average  34.9  34.4  34.2  33.8  33.5  32.9  32.4  32.2  33.5  34.5  32.5  -2.0 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Note: n.a. –  data not available. 
 
Employment protection legislation index, version 2, 2000-2007 










(2) - (1) 
Austria  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.4  2.2  -0.2 
Belgium  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  0.0 
Czech Republic  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  2.1  2.1  2.0  2.0  1.9  2.1  0.1 
Denmark  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.9  1.8  -0.1 
Finland  2.2  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  0.0 
France  2.8  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  0.0 
Germany  2.6  2.6  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.5  2.4  -0.1 
Greece  3.5  3.5  3.5  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  3.1  3.5  2.8  -0.6 
Hungary  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.7  1.5  1.8  0.2 
Ireland  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.2  1.3  0.2 
Italy  2.9  2.5  2.5  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.4  2.6  2.3  -0.3 
Netherlands  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.2  0.0 
Norway  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.7  2.7  2.6  2.6  2.7  0.1 37 
 
Poland  1.9  1.9  1.7  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.0  1.8  2.2  0.4 
Portugal  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.5  3.4  -0.2 
Slovak Republic  2.2  2.2  2.2  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.9  2.2  1.7  -0.4 
Spain  3.0  3.1  3.1  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  0.0 
Sweden  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  0.0 
United Kingdom  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  0.0 
Bulgaria*  2.8  n.a.  n.a.  2.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.9  2.2  2.8  1.9  -0.9 
Estonia*  2.4  n.a.  n.a.  2.6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2.3  2.4  2.4  2.3  -0.1 
Lithuania*  2.7  n.a.  n.a.  2.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2.8  2.8  2.7  2.8  0.1 
Latvia*  2.5  n.a.  n.a.  2.5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2.6  2.5  2.5  2.6  0.1 
Romania*  2.0  n.a.  n.a.  2.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  3.0  2.6  2.0  3.0  1.0 
Slovenia*  3.3  n.a.  n.a.  2.5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2.6  2.8  3.3  2.6  -0.7 
Total average  2.4  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  -0.1 
Old Europe 
average  2.5  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.3  2.3  2.4  2.4  2.3  -0.1 
NMS-4 average  1.9  1.9  1.8  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  0.1 
Source: OECD, IZA (*), own calculations 
Note: n.a. –  data not available; * data for year 2000 refer to year 1999 
 
Monthly minimum wage as a proportion of the mean value of average monthly earnings in 
industry and service sector, %, 2000-2007 










(2) - (1) 
Austria  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Belgium  48.8  47.5  47.6  46.2  45.5  45.7  45.5  45.3  46.5  48.0  45.5  -2.5 
Bulgaria  32.2  35.4  38.8  40.4  41.4  46.6  44.7  42.1  40.2  35.5  44.5  9.0 
Cyprus  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Czech Republic  31.0  34.2  36.9  38.1  38.4  39.1  39.7  38.1  36.9  34.0  39.0  4.9 
Denmark  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Estonia  n.a.  n.a.  30.5  32.4  34.6  33.2  30.5  30.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Finland  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
France  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  48.1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Germany  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Greece  56.2  52.9  54.7  48.6  47.5  48.6  47.7  46.3  50.3  54.6  47.5  -7.1 
Hungary  n.a.  n.a.  42.1  42.2  41.2  41.3  41.7  39.8  41.4  42.1  40.9  -1.2 
Ireland  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  43.4  n.a.  n.a.  39.7  38.6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Italy  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Latvia  34.8  39.7  37.4  39.9  41.9  36.2  33.3  34.2  37.2  37.3  34.6  -2.7 
Lithuania  44.9  44.7  43.7  42.1  45.4  44.9  42.1  38.7  43.3  44.4  41.9  -2.5 
Luxembourg   n.a.  n.a.  45.5  46.6  46.0  46.8  46.2  46.8  46.3  45.5  46.6  1.1 
Malta  44.6  36.9  44.9  48.2  47.4  50.5  50.4  49.0  46.5  42.1  50.0  7.8 
Netherlands  n.a.  n.a.  49.3  47.7  46.1  45.5  44.1  44.2  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Norway  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Poland  n.a.  n.a.  33.0  33.9  35.1  33.7  36.1  32.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Portugal  43.6  43.3  43.0  40.7  40.0  40.5  40.7  41.6  41.7  43.3  40.9  -2.4 
Romania  26.3  30.9  31.3  37.3  34.4  32.6  30.2  29.1  31.5  29.5  30.6  1.1 
Slovakia  n.a.  n.a.  32.4  34.0  34.1  34.4  34.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Slovenia  43.5  44.5  45.3  45.8  45.9  46.2  45.2  43.4  45.0  44.4  44.9  0.5 
Spain  34.7  34.2  33.5  32.9  33.6  35.1  35.8  36.5  34.5  34.1  35.8  1.7 
Sweden  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
United Kingdom  34.2  33.0  34.6  34.5  36.5  37.9  37.9  38.9  35.9  33.9  38.2  4.3 
Total average  39.6  39.8  40.3  40.8  40.8  41.0  40.3  40.2  40.3  39.9  40.5  0.7 
Old Europe 
average  43.5  42.2  44.0  42.6  42.2  42.9  42.2  42.9  42.8  43.2  42.7  -0.6 
NMS average  36.8  38.0  37.8  39.5  40.0  39.9  39.0  37.7  38.6  37.5  38.9  1.3 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Note: n.a. –  data not available 
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(2) - (1) 
Austria  36.5  35.7  35.4  34.4  34.1  33.0  31.7  n.a.  34.4  35.9  32.4  -3.5 
Belgium  49.3  49.9  51.2  52.2  52.9  52.9  54.1  52.9  51.9  50.1  53.3  3.2 
Czech Republic  29.5  25.6  21.7  22.0  22.3  21.6  21.0  21.0  23.1  25.6  21.2  -4.4 
Denmark  74.2  73.8  73.2  72.4  71.7  71.7  69.4  69.1  71.9  73.7  70.1  -3.7 
Finland  75.0  74.5  73.5  72.9  73.3  72.4  71.7  70.3  73.0  74.3  71.5  -2.9 
France  8.3  8.2  8.4  8.2  8.0  8.0  7.9  7.8  8.1  8.3  7.9  -0.4 
Germany  24.6  23.7  23.5  23.0  22.2  21.6  20.7  19.9  22.4  23.9  20.7  -3.2 
Greece  27.0  26.1  25.3  24.4  23.7  23.0  n.a.  n.a.  24.9  26.1  23.0  -3.1 
Hungary  24.2  22.5  20.5  18.5  18.2  17.8  17.3  16.9  19.5  22.4  17.3  -5.1 
Ireland  39.3  38.2  36.3  37.9  35.7  34.2  32.6  31.7  35.7  37.9  32.8  -5.1 
Italy  34.7  34.2  33.6  33.5  33.9  33.8  33.4  33.3  33.8  34.2  33.5  -0.7 
Luxembourg  43.1  42.9  42.6  42.4  42.1  41.8  n.a.  n.a.  42.5  42.9  41.8  -1.1 
Netherlands  22.6  21.9  21.7  21.2  21.3  21.0  20.4  19.8  21.2  22.1  20.4  -1.7 
Norway  54.4  53.9  54.5  55.1  55.0  54.9  54.9  53.7  54.6  54.3  54.5  0.2 
Poland  21.8  17.6  18.4  19.2  17.4  15.8  14.4  14.4  17.4  19.3  14.9  -4.4 
Portugal  19.6  19.3  19.1  18.9  18.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  19.1  19.3  n.a.  n.a. 
Slovak Republic  36.3  32.8  31.1  29.9  27.8  25.8  23.6  23.6  28.9  33.4  24.3  -9.1 
Spain  16.7  15.9  16.0  15.8  15.5  15.0  14.6  n.a.  15.6  16.2  14.8  -1.4 
Sweden  79.1  78.0  78.0  78.0  77.3  76.5  75.1  70.8  76.6  78.4  74.1  -4.2 
United Kingdom  29.6  29.1  29.1  29.0  28.8  28.8  28.2  28.0  28.8  29.3  28.3  -0.9 
Bulgaria*  26.0  n.a.  n.a.  21.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  21.3  23.1  26.0  21.3  -4.7 
Estonia*  20.0  n.a.  n.a.  15.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  13.2  16.1  20.0  13.2  -6.8 
Lithuania*  24.1  n.a.  n.a.  16.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  14.4  18.4  24.1  14.4  -9.7 
Latvia*  26.0  n.a.  n.a.  17.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  16.1  20.0  26.0  16.1  -9.9 
Romania*  46.1  n.a.  n.a.  38.5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  33.7  39.4  46.1  33.7  -12.4 
Slovenia*  43.0  n.a.  n.a.  41.3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  44.0  42.8  43.0  44.0  1.0 
Total average  37.3  36.2  35.7  35.4  35.0  35.2  34.8  35.5  35.6  36.4  35.2  -1.2 
Old Europe 
average  39.6  39.1  38.8  38.7  38.4  39.2  39.6  41.6  39.4  39.2  40.1  1.0 
NMS average  28.0  24.6  22.9  22.4  21.4  20.3  19.1  19.0  22.2  25.2  19.4  -5.7 
Source: OECD, IZA (*), own calculations 
Note: n.a. –  data not available; * data for year 2000 refer to year 1999 
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(2) - (1) 
Austria  0.108  0.121  0.098  0.106  0.090  0.089  0.113  0.117  0.105  0.109  0.106  -0.003 
Belgium  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.115  0.114  0.122  0.144  0.124  n.a.  0.127  n.a. 
Bulgaria  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.038  0.043  0.043  0.044  0.042  n.a.  0.043  n.a. 
Cyprus  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.012  0.022  0.017  n.a.  0.017  n.a. 
Czech Republic  n.a.  n.a.  0.016  0.015  0.016  0.015  0.018  0.023  0.017  0.016  0.019  0.003 
Denmark  0.404  0.381  0.378  0.300  0.276  0.263  0.311  0.269  0.323  0.388  0.281  -0.107 
Estonia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.005  0.004  0.006  0.008  0.006  0.006  n.a.  0.007  n.a. 
Finland  0.076  0.075  0.074  0.083  0.090  0.087  0.096  0.102  0.085  0.075  0.095  0.020 
France  0.112  0.115  0.104  0.091  0.078  0.071  0.073  0.082  0.091  0.110  0.076  -0.035 
Germany 
(including ex-
GDR from 1991) 
0.137  0.135  0.123  0.101  0.086  0.056  0.060  0.060  0.095  0.132  0.059  -0.073 
Greece  0.021  0.023  0.017  0.009  0.013  0.006  0.016  0.018  0.015  0.020  0.013  -0.007 
Hungary  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.033  0.028  0.026  0.028  0.029  n.a.  0.027  n.a. 
Ireland  0.154  0.181  0.140  0.118  0.110  0.108  0.101  0.102  0.127  0.159  0.104  -0.055 
Italy  0.056  0.070  0.082  0.083  0.067  0.062  0.060  0.061  0.068  0.069  0.061  -0.008 
Latvia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.008  0.008  0.018  0.027  0.018  0.016  n.a.  0.021  n.a. 
Lithuania  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.012  0.014  0.018  0.032  0.053  0.026  n.a.  0.034  n.a. 
Luxembourg 
(Grand-Duché) 
0.082  0.099  0.077  0.083  0.072  0.088  0.085  0.090  0.084  0.086  0.087  0.001 
Malta  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.009  0.005  0.007  n.a.  0.007  n.a. 
Netherlands  0.346  0.457  0.378  0.269  0.194  0.175  0.187  0.212  0.277  0.393  0.191  -0.202 39 
 
Norway  0.154  0.151  0.153  0.159  0.150  0.137  0.137  0.180  0.153  0.153  0.151  -0.002 
Poland  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.007  0.020  0.026  0.042  0.024  n.a.  0.029  n.a. 
Portugal  0.093  0.119  0.086  0.080  0.082  0.067  0.058  0.048  0.079  0.099  0.058  -0.041 
Romania  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.016  0.012  0.015  0.014  0.012  0.014  n.a.  0.014  n.a. 
Slovakia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.004  0.010  0.011  0.011  0.009  n.a.  0.011  n.a. 
Slovenia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.030  0.029  0.023  0.027  n.a.  0.027  n.a. 
Spain  0.059  0.059  0.051  0.051  0.052  0.063  0.074  0.076  0.061  0.056  0.071  0.015 
Sweden  0.270  0.244  0.224  0.153  0.133  0.141  0.162  0.146  0.184  0.246  0.149  -0.096 
United Kingdom  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.013  0.011  0.008  0.009  0.010  n.a.  0.009  n.a. 
Total average  0.148  0.159  0.133  0.092  0.070  0.067  0.069  0.071  0.101  0.147  0.069  -0.078 
Old Europe 
average  0.148  0.159  0.142  0.120  0.101  0.096  0.104  0.107  0.122  0.150  0.102  -0.047 
NMS average  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.011  0.015  0.020  0.021  0.024  0.018  n.a.  0.022  n.a. 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Note: n.a. –  data not available. 
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(2) - (1) 
Austria  0.330  0.334  0.300  0.323  0.290  0.292  0.292  0.284  0.305  0.321  0.289  -0.032 
Belgium  0.306  0.323  0.309  0.299  0.283  0.274  0.262  0.266  0.290  0.312  0.267  -0.045 
Bulgaria  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.022  0.021  0.020  0.022  0.021  n.a.  0.021  n.a. 
Cyprus  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.143  0.117  0.130  n.a.  0.130  n.a. 
Czech Republic        0.038  0.039  0.030  0.031  0.032  0.038  0.035  0.038  0.034  -0.004 
Denmark  0.554  0.505  0.502  0.493  0.484  0.488  0.477  0.394  0.487  0.520  0.453  -0.067 
Estonia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.019  0.018  0.015  0.014  0.021  0.017  n.a.  0.016  n.a. 
Finland  0.213  0.216  0.223  0.229  0.231  0.226  0.221  0.207  0.221  0.217  0.218  0.001 
France  0.153  0.170  0.183  0.192  0.183  0.170  0.150  0.148  0.169  0.169  0.156  -0.013 
Germany 
(including ex-
GDR from 1991) 
0.252  0.253  0.255  0.245  0.237  0.219  0.213  0.193  0.233  0.253  0.209  -0.045 
Greece  0.035  0.033  0.032  0.038  0.038  0.041  0.043  0.040  0.038  0.033  0.041  0.008 
Hungary  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.061  0.061  0.054  0.048  0.048  0.054  n.a.  0.050  n.a. 
Ireland  0.190  0.183  0.185  0.192  0.198  0.188  0.190  0.198  0.191  0.186  0.192  0.006 
Italy  0.061  0.067  0.077  0.077  0.092  0.105  0.116  0.117  0.089  0.068  0.113  0.044 
Latvia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.035  0.036  0.035  0.043  0.048  0.039  n.a.  0.042  n.a. 
Lithuania  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.012  0.010  0.015  0.022  0.026  0.017  n.a.  0.021  n.a. 
Luxembourg 
(Grand-Duché) 
0.196  0.245  0.193  0.156  0.128  0.142  0.128  0.124  0.164  0.211  0.131  -0.080 
Malta  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.057  0.056  0.057  n.a.  0.057  n.a. 
Netherlands  0.625  0.761  0.610  0.527  0.456  0.427  0.437  0.434  0.535  0.665  0.433  -0.233 
Norway  0.157  0.159  0.179  0.206  0.196  0.190  0.146  0.166  0.175  0.165  0.167  0.003 
Poland  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.042  0.048  0.051  0.053  0.049  n.a.  0.051  n.a. 
Portugal  0.206  0.238  0.192  0.194  0.185  0.171  0.158  0.134  0.185  0.212  0.155  -0.057 
Romania  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.075  0.060  0.055  0.038  0.036  0.053  n.a.  0.043  n.a. 
Slovakia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.019  0.016  0.025  0.033  0.023  n.a.  0.025  n.a. 
Slovenia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.060  0.064  0.061  0.062  n.a.  0.062  n.a. 
Spain  0.121  0.133  0.133  0.131  0.141  0.158  0.168  0.174  0.145  0.129  0.167  0.038 
Sweden  0.239  0.180  0.169  0.179  0.174  0.154  0.137  0.109  0.168  0.196  0.133  -0.063 
United Kingdom  0.055  0.051  0.048  0.045  0.039  0.038  0.034  0.030  0.043  0.051  0.034  -0.017 
Total average  0.231  0.241  0.213  0.171  0.146  0.140  0.133  0.128  0.175  0.228  0.134  -0.095 
Old Europe 
average  0.231  0.241  0.224  0.220  0.210  0.205  0.198  0.189  0.215  0.232  0.197  -0.035 
NMS average  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.040  0.033  0.035  0.046  0.047  0.040  n.a.  0.043  n.a. 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Note: n.a. –  data not available. 
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Annex 3 – Variables used in the analysis – definitions and data sources 
 
SHADOW ECONOMY 
Name  Abbreviation  Source  Years  Sample  Description 
Shadow economy as 
percentage share on official 
GDP  
SHEC  Schneider et al. 
(2010) 
1999-2007  S1+S2+S3 
Estimations based on a Multiple Indicators Multiple 
Causes (MIMIC) model approach 
Share of labor force not 
contributing to pension 
system  
CONTRIB  Eurostat: European 
Union-Statistics on 
Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) 
2007  S2+S3 
Share of labor force not contributing to pension system 
(both private and public) adjusted for the unemployment 
rate (%) 
Share of labor force working 
in small firms  
LESS10  Eurostat: Labor 
Force Survey (LFS) 
2006-2007  S1+S2+S3  Share of labor force working in small firms (under 10 
employees; %) 
Share of labor force being 
self-employers 
SELFEMPL  Eurostat: Labor 
Force Survey (LFS) 
2006-2007  S1+S2+S3 
Share of labor force being self-employers (%) 
Share of labor force 
employed without a legal 
contract 
CONTRACT  Eurostat: Labor 
Force Survey (LFS) 
2001-2007  S1+S2+S3 
Share of labor force employed on temporary contract 
basis or without a legal contract (%) 
LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
Name  Abbreviation  Source  Years  Sample  Description 
Employment protection 
legislation 
EPL2  OECD  2000-2007  S1+ S3  Employment protection legislation index, version 2, 
higher index reflects more rigid legislation. 
Minimum wage  MWSH  OECD  2000-2007  S1  Minimum wage: share on median wage in the economy, 
cluster variable (0-3), higher score means greater burden 
of minimum wage (0 in case statutory minimum wage not 
implemented). 
Trade union membership  TU  OECD  2000-2007  S1+ S3  Trade union membership, share of all workers (%). 
Total tax wedge on labor  TAXW  OECD  2000-2007  S1+ S3 
Total tax wedge on labor: average personal income tax 
and social security contribution rates on gross labor 
income, 100% of average wage. The combined central 
and sub-central government income tax plus employee 
and employer social security contribution taxes, as a 
percentage of labor costs defined as gross wage earnings 
plus employer social security contributions. The tax 
wedge includes cash transfers. 
Active labor market policy 
expenditure 
LMPA  OECD  2000-2007  S1+ S3  Active labor market policy expenditure (categories 20-70), 
% GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
Passive labor market policy 
expenditure  
LMPP  OECD  2000-2007  S1  Passive labor market policy expenditure (categories 80-
90), % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
Labor freedom  EPL  Heritage Foundation  2006-2007  S2  Measure describing legal and regulatory framework of a 
country's labor market. Six quantitative factors are 
equally weighted, with each counted as one-sixth of the 
labor freedom component: 1) ratio of minimum wage to 
the average value added per worker, 2) hindrance to 
hiring additional workers, 3) rigidity of hours, 4) difficulty 
of firing redundant employees, 5) legally mandated notice 
period, 6) mandatory severance pay. 
Minimum wage  MWPPS  Eurostat  2006-2007  S2+ S3  Minimum wage in PPS, cluster variable (0-4), higher score 
means greater burden of minimum wage (0 in case 
statutory minimum wage not implemented). 
Implicit tax rate on labor  TAXR  Eurostat  2006-2007  S2  Total tax rate on labor computed as the ratio of total tax 
revenues of the category labor to a proxy of the potential 
tax base defined using the production and income 
accounts of the national accounts. 
Active labor market policy 
expenditure 
LMPA  Eurostat  2006-2007  S2  Active labor market policy expenditure (categories 20-70), 
% GDP per percentage point of unemployment. 
Passive labor market policy 
expenditure  
LMPP  Eurostat  2006-2007  S2 + S3  Passive labor market policy expenditure (categories 80-
90), % GDP per percentage point of unemployment. 
Employment protection 
legislation 
EPL2  IZA  2007  S3  Employment protection legislation index, version 2, 
higher index reflects more rigid legislation. 
Trade union membership  TU  IZA  2007  S3 
Trade union membership, share of all workers (%). 41 
 
Total tax wedge on labor  TAXW  IZA  2007  S3  Total tax wedge on labor: average personal income tax 
and social security contribution rates on gross labor 
income, 100% of average wage. The combined central 
and sub-central government income tax plus employee 
and employer social security contribution taxes, as a 
percentage of labor costs defined as gross wage earnings 
plus employer social security contributions. The tax 
wedge includes cash transfers. 
Active labor market policy 
expenditure 
LMPA  IZA  2007   S3  Active labor market policy expenditure (categories 20-70), 
% GDP per percentage point of unemployment. 
CONTROL VARIABLES ON ECONOMIC-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Name  Abbreviation  Source  Years  Sample  Description 
GDP per capita  GDPPC  World Bank  2000-2007  S1+ S2+ S3  Logarithm GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
Fiscal freedom  FISF  Heritage Foundation  2000-2007  S1+ S2+ S3  Measure of the tax burden imposed by government. 
Includes both the direct tax burden on individual and 
corporate incomes and the overall amount of tax 
revenue. Composed of three quantitative factors: 1) top 
tax rate on individual income, 2) top tax rate on corporate 
income, 3) total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. 
Business freedom  BUSF  Heritage Foundation  2000-2007  S1+ S2+ S3  Quantitative measure of the ability to start, operate, and 
close a business that represents the overall burden of 
regulation as well as the efficiency of government in the 
regulatory process. The business freedom score for each 
country is a number between 0 and 100, with 100 
equaling the freest business environment. The score is 
based on 10 factors, all weighted equally, using data from 
the World Bank’s Doing Business study. 




2000-2007  S1+ S2+ S3  The measure shows the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by 
elites and private interests. The higher the score, the 
better control of corruption. Data for 2001 interpolated 
from years 2000 and 2002. 




2000-2007  S1+ S2+ S3  Measure of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. The higher the 
score, the better regulatory quality. Data for 2001 
interpolated from years 2000 and 2002. 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, World Bank, Heritage Foundation, IZA 
Note: specification of the samples (S1, S2 and S3) is given in text. 
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Annex 4 – Detailed description of applied regression models 
Model 1.1 
Dependent variable: shadow economy as percentage share on overall official GDP (SHEC) 
Explanatory variables:  
EPL2  OECD index, version 2 
MWSH  OECD, share of minimum wage on median wage in the economy 
TU  OECD, Trade union membership, % wage earners 
TAXW  OECD, Total tax wedge on labor 
LMPA  OECD, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  OECD, Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  WB, GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2000-2007, S1 (15 old EU members, 4 NMS) 
 
Model 1.2 
Dependent variable: shadow economy as percentage share on overall official GDP (SHEC) 
Explanatory variables:  
EPL  Heritage Foundation, Labor freedom 
MWPPS  Eurostat, minimum wage in PPS 
TAXR  Eurostat, Implicit tax on labor 
LMPA  Eurostat, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  Eurostat , Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2006-2007, S2 (16 old EU members, 12 NMS) 
 
Model 1.3 
Dependent variable: shadow economy as percentage share on overall official GDP (SHEC) 
Explanatory variables:  
EPL2  OECD index, version 2 
MWPPS  Eurostat, share of minimum wage on median wage in the economy 
TU  OECD, Trade union membership, % wage earners 
TAXW  OECD, Total tax wedge on labor 
LMPA  OECD, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  OECD, Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  WB, GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2003 and 2007, S3 (16 old EU members, 10 NMS) 
 
Model 2.1 
Dependent  variable:  share  of  labor  force  not  contributing  to  the  pension  system  –  both  public  and  private 
(CONTRIB)  
Data sample: 2007, S1 - 9 countries only, LACK OF DATA FOR REGRESISON ESTIMATION 
 
Model 2.2 
Dependent  variable:  share  of  labor  force  not  contributing  to  the  pension  system  –  both  public  and  private 
(CONTRIB) 
Explanatory variables:  
EPL  Heritage Foundation, Labor freedom 
MWPPS  Eurostat, minimum wage in PPS 
TAXR  Eurostat, Implicit tax on labor 43 
 
LMPA  Eurostat, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  Eurostat , Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2007, S2 (11 old EU members, 7 NMS) 
 
Model 2.3 
Dependent  variable:  share  of  labor  force  not  contributing  to  the  pension  system  –  both  public  and  private 
(CONTRIB) 
Explanatory variables:  
EPL2  OECD index, version 2 
MWPPS  Eurostat, share of minimum wage on median wage in the economy 
TU  OECD, Trade union membership, % wage earners 
TAXW  OECD, Total tax wedge on labor 
LMPA  OECD, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  OECD, Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  WB, GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2003 and 2007, S3 (11 old EU members, 6 NMS) 
 
Model 3.1 
Dependent variable: share of labor force employed in small firms with less than 10 employees (LESS10)  
Explanatory variables:  
EPL2  OECD index, version 2 
MWSH  OECD, share of minimum wage on median wage in the economy 
TU  OECD, Trade union membership, % wage earners 
TAXW  OECD, Total tax wedge on labor 
LMPA  OECD, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  OECD, Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  WB, GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2000-2007, S1 (15 old EU members, 4 NMS) 
 
Model 3.2 
Dependent variable: share of labor force employed in small firms with less than 10 employees (LESS10)  
Explanatory variables:  
EPL  Heritage Foundation, Labor freedom 
MWPPS  Eurostat, minimum wage in PPS 
TAXR  Eurostat, Implicit tax on labor 
LMPA  Eurostat, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  Eurostat , Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2006-2007, S2 (16 old EU members, 11 NMS) 
 
Model 3.3 
Dependent variable: share of labor force employed in small firms with less than 10 employees (LESS10)  
Explanatory variables:  44 
 
EPL2  OECD index, version 2 
MWPPS  Eurostat, share of minimum wage on median wage in the economy 
TU  OECD, Trade union membership, % wage earners 
TAXW  OECD, Total tax wedge on labor 
LMPA  OECD, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  OECD, Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  WB, GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2003 and 2007, S3 (15 old EU members, 9 NMS) 
 
Model 4.1 
Dependent variable: share of labor force being self-employers (SELFEMPL)  
Explanatory variables:  
EPL2  OECD index, version 2 
MWSH  OECD, share of minimum wage on median wage in the economy 
TU  OECD, Trade union membership, % wage earners 
TAXW  OECD, Total tax wedge on labor 
LMPA  OECD, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  OECD, Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  WB, GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2000-2007, S1 (15 old EU members, 4 NMS) 
 
Model 4.2 
Dependent variable: share of labor force being self-employers (SELFEMPL)  
Explanatory variables:  
EPL  Heritage Foundation, Labor freedom 
MWPPS  Eurostat, minimum wage in PPS 
TAXR  Eurostat, Implicit tax on labor 
LMPA  Eurostat, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  Eurostat , Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2006-2007, S2 (16 old EU members, 11 NMS) 
 
Model 4.3 
Dependent variable: share of labor force being self-employers (SELFEMPL)  
Explanatory variables:  
EPL2  OECD index, version 2 
MWPPS  Eurostat, share of minimum wage on median wage in the economy 
TU  OECD, Trade union membership, % wage earners 
TAXW  OECD, Total tax wedge on labor 
LMPA  OECD, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  OECD, Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  WB, GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 




Dependent variable: share of labor force without a legal written contract (CONTRACT)  
Explanatory variables:  
EPL2  OECD index, version 2 
MWSH  OECD, share of minimum wage on median wage in the economy 
TU  OECD, Trade union membership, % wage earners 
TAXW  OECD, Total tax wedge on labor 
LMPA  OECD, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  OECD, Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  WB, GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2000-2007, S1 (15 old EU members, 4 NMS) 
 
Model 5.2 
Dependent variable: share of labor force without a legal written contract (CONTRACT)  
Explanatory variables:  
EPL  Heritage Foundation, Labor freedom 
MWPPS  Eurostat, minimum wage in PPS 
TAXR  Eurostat, Implicit tax on labor 
LMPA  Eurostat, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  Eurostat , Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2006-2007, S2 (16 old EU members, 11 NMS) 
 
Model 5.3 
Dependent variable: share of labor force without a legal written contract (CONTRACT)  
Explanatory variables:  
EPL2  OECD index, version 2 
MWPPS  Eurostat, share of minimum wage on median wage in the economy 
TU  OECD, Trade union membership, % wage earners 
TAXW  OECD, Total tax wedge on labor 
LMPA  OECD, Active LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
LMPP  OECD, Passive LMP expenditure, % GDP per percentage point of unemployment 
GDPPC  WB, GDP per capita, purchasing power parities 
FISF  Heritage Foundation, Fiscal freedom 
BUSF  Heritage Foundation, Business freedom 
CORR  WB, Control of corruption 
REGQUAL  WB, Regulatory quality 
Data sample: 2003 and 2007, S3 (16 old EU members, 9 NMS) 
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Annex 5 – Pair-wise correlations between dependent and independent variables 
 
Sample S1 
   shec  contrib  less10  selfempl  contract 
shec  1             
contrib  0.6016*  1          
less10  0.2630*  0.1083  1       
selfempl  0.6646*  0.9045*  0.4063*  1    
contract  0.1633*  -0.0546  -0.0125  0.0596  1 
 
   shec  contrib  less10  selfempl  contract 
tax  0.1273  -0.1844  -0.1859*  -0.2421*  0.0183 
epl  0.3617*  0.2557  0.3907*  0.3477*  0.5477* 
tu  -0.1024  -0.4298  -0.035  -0.3489*  -0.0875 
lmpa  -0.3246*  -0.5016  -0.1359  -0.4035*  0.0745 
lmpp  -0.4420*  -0.3473  -0.2081*  -0.3785*  0.1296 
mw  0.1549  0.6074*  -0.0339  0.2778*  -0.0477 
lngdppc  -0.5331*  -0.1287  0.1055  -0.3425*  0.0163 
fisf  0.1649*  0.2627  0.0701  0.2995*  -0.1638* 
busf  -0.3515*  -0.386  0.0114  -0.2620*  -0.1323 
corr  -0.6464*  -0.5973*  -0.1551  -0.5771*  0.1561 
regqual  -0.6891*  -0.5246  -0.2174*  -0.4956*  -0.0039 
 
   tax  epl  tu  lmpa  lmpp  mw  lngdppc  fisf  busf  corr  regqual 
tax  1                               
epl  0.2480*  1                            
tu  0.0775  -0.1314  1                         
lmpa  -0.0051  0.0221  0.4855*  1                      
lmpp  0.0801  0.0551  0.3436*  0.8894*  1                   
mw  -0.1751*  0.0262  -0.5391*  -0.1987*  -0.1656*  1                
lngdppc  -0.1514  0.0283  0.4247*  0.5448*  0.5315*  -0.2704*  1             
fisf  -0.4106*  -0.3246*  -0.4858*  -0.6500*  -0.6114*  0.2840*  -0.4783*  1          
busf  -0.2618*  -0.3620*  0.4056*  0.2769*  0.2627*  -0.097  0.4422*  -0.1119  1       
corr  -0.0271  -0.0773  0.5869*  0.6381*  0.6646*  -0.3767*  0.7673*  -0.5431*  0.4836*  1    




   shec  contrib  less10  selfempl  contract 
shec  1             
contrib  0.4152  1          
less10  -0.006  0.1622  1       
selfempl  0.3719*  0.8856*  0.1286  1    
contract  -0.1468  -0.0216  0.0881  0.1535  1 
   
   shec  contrib  less10  selfempl  contract 
tax  -0.2316  -0.2937  0.0374  -0.1731  0.1432 
epl  0.0377  -0.1167  0.1646  -0.0154  0.4042* 
lmpa  -0.4807*  -0.4058  0.114  -0.3410*  0.2023 
lmpp  -0.5484*  -0.2569  -0.0023  -0.1865  0.3041* 
mw  -0.1802  0.3542  -0.2908*  0.0617  0.0789 
lngdppc  -0.7970*  -0.0741  0.2439  -0.2448  0.2338 
fisf  0.5060*  0.2193  -0.1348  0.1163  -0.4433* 
busf  -0.4640*  -0.3682  0.0742  -0.3931*  -0.0084 
corr  -0.7603*  -0.5389*  0.0989  -0.4737*  0.2607 
regqual  -0.7401*  -0.434  -0.0616  -0.4855*  -0.0022 
 
   tax  epl  lmpa  lmpp  mw  lngdppc  fisf  busf  corr  regqual 
tax  1                            
epl  0.0979  1                         
lmpa  0.3710*  -0.2107  1                      
lmpp  0.2666*  -0.1335  0.8745*  1                   
mw  -0.3177*  0.0956  -0.1598  -0.0615  1                
lngdppc  0.231  0.1195  0.5536*  0.5617*  0.1706  1             
fisf  -0.5247*  0.0248  -0.7248*  -0.6635*  0.0035  -0.6506*  1          
busf  0.2542  -0.026  0.6473*  0.5776*  -0.0512  0.5670*  -0.5273*  1       47 
 
corr  0.1907  0.1124  0.6925*  0.6965*  -0.0151  0.8206*  -0.6709*  0.7590*  1    




   shec  contrib  less10  selfempl  contract 
shec  1             
contrib  0.3811  1          
less10  0.0477  0.1421  1       
selfempl  0.3630*  0.8799*  0.2558  1    
contract  -0.1455  -0.031  0.0791  0.0996  1 
 
   shec  contrib  less10  selfempl  contract 
tax  -0.1664  -0.1521  -0.1621  -0.2082  0.054 
epl  0.273  0.211  0.2661  0.2166  0.3202* 
tu  -0.2574  -0.3635  0.072  -0.223  0.0231 
lmpa  -0.4664*  -0.3923  0.0293  -0.3400*  0.2053 
lmpp  -0.5427*  -0.2478  -0.0757  -0.2426  0.2683 
mw  -0.2174  0.4353  -0.169  0.1368  0.0711 
lngdppc  -0.8134*  -0.0497  0.1371  -0.247  0.2188 
fisf  0.4751*  0.1715  -0.1018  0.1189  -0.4232* 
busf  -0.4325*  -0.3332  0.046  -0.3452*  0.0083 
corr  -0.7756*  -0.5310*  -0.0176  -0.4481*  0.2936* 
regqual  -0.7444*  -0.4402  -0.1283  -0.4781*  0.0888 
 
   tax  epl  tu  lmpa  lmpp  mw  lngdppc  fisf  busf  corr  regqual 
tax  1                               
epl  0.2962*  1                            
tu  0.1226  -0.1252  1                         
lmpa  0.0877  -0.0434  0.5534*  1                      
lmpp  0.1442  -0.0398  0.4114*  0.8951*  1                   
mw  -0.1483  0.0069  -0.3710*  -0.1017  -0.0121  1                
lngdppc  0.1609  -0.0427  0.4145*  0.5676*  0.5423*  0.2115  1             
fisf  -0.3623*  -0.0694  -0.5639*  -0.7014*  -0.6840*  0.0325  -0.5934*  1          
busf  -0.0588  -0.2064  0.4338*  0.4423*  0.3801*  0.0234  0.5561*  -0.2855*  1       
corr  0.1248  -0.117  0.5686*  0.6993*  0.7051*  -0.0072  0.8181*  -0.6606*  0.6342*  1    
regqual  0.0443  -0.2705  0.4059*  0.5817*  0.5743*  0.1001  0.7829*  -0.4275*  0.6800*  0.8868*  1 
 
Note: coefficients significant at 5% significance level marked with asterisk. 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, World Bank, Heritage Foundation, IZA, own calculations 